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VZA- 4--.:.. ~, 
I am still waiting for the record in this case. I doubt 
that it will help very much in arguing that the Lockett point was 
argued below, in substance, although not by name. ~ 
I have enclosed xeroxes of the relevant portions of the 
opinions by the county court and the court of criminal appeals. 
I think you are going to run into the following arguments at 
conference: 
1. It may be argued that although the trial court did 
not, the appeal court did consider the full range of mitigating 
circumstances. It found that Eddings' emotional disturbance and 
family background did not "excuse" what he did. If one believes 
that the appeal court did consider the full range of mitigating 
circumstances then one would either be inclined not to remand on 
Lockett at all or one might argue that the matter should be 
remanded to the sentencing judge for him to consider the full 
range of mitigating circumstances. This second approach raises 
the question you and I discussed earlier in the term as to 
whether review by a state appeal court can cure error by the 
sentencer. The Court's current position is that such review does 
cure error, and I don't think that the Court can remand to the 
trial court without changing this position. 
" 
*I lla v~ ~ V't'Wtd r-e c__f'Jrd. The 
The. fe-t-,;uJY\ -('..r r~t~,rrn'J 
t:<.prr 4_ f $ 
Loc..l f' rr ("~; "'1 wa j ,..~ rst"l ~ I~ 
~et:>1~ TJ..c ( Dr...t.rt o.f <,....,1\..A • .,_A-f 
2. More plausible to me, is that the state appeal 
court did not consider the full range of mitigating 
circumstances. When you read the full paragraph, it appears that 
the appellate court confused legal excuses from culpability with 
circumstances mitigating the sentence. The court emphasizes that 
Eddings knew right from wrong and that "explanations" were not 
"excuses." At least if the paragraph may be read this way--if 
there is ambiguity--a remand would be appropriate. 
3. There will be some question as to whether the Court 
can consider the Lockett point when the question was not argued 
to the courts below and was not even argued in the cert petition. 
It appears that in Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 u.s. 478 (1974), 
the Court did consider a plain error that had not been argued in 
the court below nor in the jurisdictional statement. 
Perhaps it can be argued that although Lockett was not 
specifically argued to the lower courts, the question of what 
range of mitigating circumstances must be considered was very 
much on the minds of both the trial court and the court of 
criminal appeals. Both courts appeared to rule that personality 
disorders and family background do not qualify as mitigating 
circumstances. In this sense, although Lockett was not argued by 
name, the courts have issued judgments on the question of whether 
family background and emotional disorders must be considered 
mitigating circumstances. I think it fair for the Court to 
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~ltpUntt Qfonrlllf tqt ~{)- ~taftg 
:.a..Glfing-hln. lB· <!J. 2.l1~'t~ 
November 16, 1981 
Re: No. 80-5727 - Eddings v. Oklahoma 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONfERENCE: 




Draft: No. 80-5727, Eddings v. Oklahoma 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of 
first degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this 
sentence was imposed without "the type of individualized 
consideration of mitigating factors required by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," 




On April 4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, 
and several younger companions ran away from their 
Missouri homes. They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' 
~ ~ J'IA,. ~ trl-4t..,. • .:, ~J.....,... '1 
brother, drivingA without destination or purpose in a 
" ' ~tfS Art~ ~~· -~~~ 
southwesterly direction. ~ 9~ tsA-e ~96>1: ei ~ 
~ .Hwt-~ If- ~~-,..WJ .r.........l,. - ~ 
/\several rifles i:ddil"l'9'S .Jhad taken from his father. After 
I-.., 
Ee~H·fl~s ~ momentarily lost control of the car, he was 
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma 
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer 
approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of 
the window and fired, killing the Officer. 
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved 
to have him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding 
-that there was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that 
Eddings was not amenable to rehabilitation within the 
juvenile system, the trial court granted the motion. The 
ruling was affirmed on appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P.2d 
1340 (Okl. Cr. 1978), cert denied, 436 U.S. 921 (1978). 
Eddings was then charged with murder in the first degree, 
3 • 
. . 
and the District Court of Creek County found him guilty 
upon his plea of nolo contendere. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in 
pertinent part: 
"Upon conviction ••• of guilt of a defendant of 
murder in the first degree, the court shall 
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to 
determine whether the defendant should be 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment ••.. In 
the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be 
presented as to any mitigating circumstances or 
as to any of the aggravating circumstances 
enumerated in this act." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 
21, § 701.10 (emphasis added). 
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating 
circumstances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant 
by "any mitigating circumstances." 
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged 
three of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the 
statute~~e ~~-•~ed th~ murder was especially 
~ 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the crime was committed 
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, 
and that there was a probability that the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 
701.12(4), (5), & (7). 
4. 
~~~ 
In mitigation, Eddings presented evidence at the 
<\ 
hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his 
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had 
been raised without proper guidance. His parents were 
divorced when he was five, and until he was fourteen 
Eddings lived with his mother without any rules or 
supervision. There is the suggestion that Eddings' mother 
was an alcoholic and possibly a prostitute. Appx. at 110. 
By the time Eddings was fourteen he ~ no longer~ be 
controlled, and his mother sent him to live with his 
father. But neither could the father control the boy. 
Attempts to reason and talk gave way to physical 
punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings 
~/,_~ 
was s..c&red and bitter, that his father overreacted and 
-\ 
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found 
the only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy 
was actual punishment, or physical violence--hitting with 
a strap or something like this." Appx. at 121. 
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that 
Eddings was seriously emotionally disturbed in general and 
at the time of the crime, and that his mental and 
5. 
emotional dev.elopment were at a level several years below 
his age. Appx. at 173. A State psychologist stated that 
Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social personality and 
that 30% of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out 
of it as they aged. A sociologist specializing in 
juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. 
A psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be 
rehabilitated by intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year 
period. He testified further that Eddings was 
disassociating at the time of the murder, and that "he did 
pull the trigger, he did kill someone, but I don't even 
think he knew that he was doing it." 1The psychiatrist 
suggested that, if treated, Eddings would no longer pose a 
threat to society. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial 
judge weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
1The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of 
the murder, Eddings was in his own mind shooting his 
stepfather--a policeman who had been married to his mother 
for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The 
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances 
and the facts of his life, and the facts of his arrested 
development, he acted as a seven year old seeking revenge 
and rebellion: and the act--he did pull the trigger, he 
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he 
was doing it." Appx. 172. 
6. 
circumstances. He found that the State had proved each of 
the three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 2 Turning to the evidence of mitigating 
circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a 
mitigating factor of great weight: "I have given very 
serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when 
this particular crime was commmitted. Should I fail to do 
this, I think I would not be carrying out my duty." But 
he would not consider 
~ 
in mitigation 
c:.c..,. u~ ._1:;. .... < ~ ....... 
the evide~ee of 
~ 
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance: II 
... the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the .•. fact 
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heineous CstL] 
crime was committed. Nor can the Court in following the 
law, in my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's 
violent background." (emphasis added). Finding that the 
~2The trial judge found first that the crime was 
"hein~ous, L atrocious, and cruel" because "designed to 
inflict a Righ degree of pain •.. in utter indifference to 
the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." Second, the judge 
found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." 
The evidence was sufficient to indicate that at the time 
of the offense Eddings did not wish to be returned to 
Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's intent 
was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, based on two 
threatening statements made by Eddings in the wake of the 
arrest, the judge found a strong likelihood that Eddings 
would again commit a criminal act of violence if released. 
7. 
only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and 
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh 
the aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced 
Eddings to death. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 
sentence of death. It found that each of the aggravating 
circumstances alleged by the State had been present. It 
recited the mitigating evidence presented by Eddings in 
some detail, but in the end it agreed with the trial court 
that only the fact of Eddings' youth was properly 
considered as a mitigating circumstance: 
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the 
time of the murder. He stresses his family 
history in saying he was suffering from severe 
psychological and emotional disorders, and that 
the killing was in actuality an inevitable 
product of the way he was raised. There is no 
doubt that the petitioner has a personality 
disorder. But all the evidence tends to show 
that he knew the difference between right and 
wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and 
that is the test of crimina! responsibility in 
this State. For the same reason, the 
petitioner's family history is useful in 
explaining why he behaved the way he did, but it 
does not excuse his behavior." 
8. 
II 
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), CHIEF 
JUSTICE BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule 
which we apply today: 3 
"[W] e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that the sentencer •.• not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or 
record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604. 
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public 
authority is profoundly different from all other 
penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be 
free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of 
the defendant's character and record and to circumstances 
of the offense proffered in mitigation." Id. at 605. 
Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted 
consideration of three mitigating circumstances, the Court 
found the statute to be invalid. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is 
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's 
3aecause we decide 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
question of whether the 
execution of a defendant 
offense. 
this case on the basis of 
586 (1978), we do not reach the 
eighth amendment forbids the 
who was 16 ( at the time of the 




effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once 
consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to 
the uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days 
of the common law, the legal system has struggled to 
accommodate these twin objectives. Thus, the common law 
began by treating all criminal homicides as capital 
iLk 
offenses, with a mandatory sentence of death,_ but: tJ:1,Q.n 
~..;f d 
SQ.W~R t-...eG allow eo£ exceptions) first through an exclusion 
~ " 
for those entitled to claim benefit of clergy and then by 
limiting capital punishment to murders upon "malice 
~ 
prepensed." In Qo~ ~n 1. country we attempted to soften 
the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences we 
inherited from England, first by grading murder into 
different degrees of which only murder of the first degree 
was a capital offense and then by committing use of the 
death penalty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By 
the time of our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 
238 (1972) , the country had moved so far from a mandatory 
system that the imposition of capital punishment Mil eMs 
~~ecome arbitrary and capricious. 
10 • 
. . 
Beginning with the decision in Furman, the Court 
4-~d~ 
has attempted to provide 9'WiQ&liAliS for a constitutional 
death penalty that would serve both goals of measured, 
a4:~4.....t. 
consistent application and fairness to the iAQi~&wsl. 
Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153 (1976), the 
plurality held that the danger of an arbitary and 
capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority 
is given adequate information and guidance." Id. at 195. 
By its requirement that the jury find one of the 
aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty 
statute, and by its direction to the jury to consider 
"any mitigating circumstances," the Georgia statute 
properly confined and directed the jury's attention to the 
circumstances of the particular crime and to "the 
characteristics of the person who committed the crime." 
Id. at 197. 4 
4"[T]he jury's attention is focused on the 
characteristics of the person who committed the crime: 
.•. Are there any special facts about this defendant that 
mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his 
youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, his 
emotional state at the time of the crime)." 428 u.s., at 
197 .. 
11. 
Similarly, in woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
u.s. 280 (1976), the plurality held that mandatory death 
sentencing was not a permissible response to the problem 
of arbitrary ~A~ jury discretion. As the history 
of capital punishment had shown, such an approach to the 
problem of discretion could not succeed while the eighth 
amendment required that the individual be given his due: 
"the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the 
Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the 
character and record of the individual offender and the 
circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of 
inflicting the penalty of death." Id. at 304. 5 See 
Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977): 
Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 u.s. 325 (1976). 
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the 
--------:::::::- d>s/ s 
5"A that accords no significance to 
relevant fae ees of the character and record of the 
individual offender or the circumstances of the particular 
offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ~lt~ma te 
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or 
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a 
designated offense not as uniquely individual human 
beings." Ibid 
12. 
earlier decisions of the Court and from the Court's 
insistence that capital punishment be impose El fairlyJ and 
wtU-~••""*"'~IL consistently or not at all. 
A ) 
By requiring that the 
sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of 
the person who committed the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
t-ec:o{t\ I Zt:S -fh«- -f 
u.s., at 197, the rule in Lockett re£~es %he aem«Rd of 
• .. • r-es"', r-(' !I'" .. .../ 
11justice \ that r there be taken into account the 
circumstances of the offense together with the character 
and propensities of the offender." Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 
302 u.s. 51, 55 (1937). By holding that the sentencer in 
capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant 
mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a 
consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is 
a false consistency. 
III 
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the 
circumstances of this case. 6 The trial judge stated that 
6Edd ings did not argue to the trial court or to 
the Court of Criminal Appeals on his direct appeal that 
the sentencing procedure violated the rule in Lockett. 
Nor did he include the argument on Lockett in his petition 
for certiorari. Even so, ,~ we bel1eve that in the 
circumstances here it is appropriate to treat the question 
as one raised below and properly before us. 
'Fe- Se-EjiA wit:A., Eddings did raise the argument in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
13. 
' . 
"in following the law," he could not "consider the fact of 
this young man's violent background." There is no dispute 
that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring 
to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history. 7 
his petition for rehearing to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals. In that petition, he explicitly argued that the 
failure of the trial court or Court of Criminal Appeals to 
consider his emotional condition or family background as 
mitigating circumstances violated the decision of this 
Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 u.s. 586 (1980). See 
Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief, Proposition 
III, at 10 ("This Court, by its intepretation of 
mitigating circumstances, has effectively limited the 
scope of mitigaiton and that limitation renders the 
Oklahoma death penalty statute unconstitutional"). 
The Court of Criminal Appeals will entertain new 
arguments upon a petition for rehearing as a matter of 
course. Rule 1.18 provides that a petition for rehearing 
"shall briefly state the grounds upon which counsel relies 
for a hearing and show either that some question decisive 
of the case and duly submitted by the counsel has been 
overlooked by the Court; or, that the decision is in 
conflict with an express statute or controlling decision 
to which the attention of the Court was not called either 
in brief or oral argument" (emphasis added). See Bias v. 
State, 561 P.2d 523, 538 (1977); Cooper v. State, 432 P.2d 
951 (1967). The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Eddings' 
petition for rehearing stating that it had given it full 
consideration and had been "fully advised in the 
premises." See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469, 476 (1975). 
Moreover, in the interests of justice we may 
consider a plain error in the record even when not argued 
below or in the petition for certiorari. See Rule 
34.l(a), Rules of the Supreme Court; 28 u.s.c. § 2106. 
We have used this power sparingly but it is applied 
appropriately "in a case such as this, where the death 
penalty was imposed in a plainly unconstitutional manner." 
Beck v. Alabama, 447 u.s. 625, 631 n.6 (1980). Cf. Wood 
v. Georgia, __ u.s. __ , __ n.5 (1981); Vachonv. New 
Hampshire, 414 U.S. 4 78 (197 4) ; Stern & Gressman, Supreme 
Court Practice § 6. 27, at 460 (in review of state cases, 
"the Court doubtless limits its power to notice plain 
error to those situations where it feels the error is so 
serious as to consititute a fundamental unfairness in the 
proceedings"). 




From this statement it appealis that the trial judge did 
not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it 
wanting as a matter of fact, rather he found that as a 
matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same 
approach. It found that the evidence in mitigation was 
not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal 
excuse from criminal responsibility. Thus the court 
c"onceded that Eddings had a personality disorder, but cast 
this evidence aside on the basis that "he knew the 
difference between right and wrong . . • and that is the 
test of criminal responsibility." Similarly, the evidence 
of Eddings' family history was "useful in explaining" his 
behavior, but it did not "excuse" the behavior. From 
these statements it appears that the Court of Criminal 
~ 
Appeals "~c~idere~ that evidence to be mitigating 
which would tend to support a legal excuse from crimina! 
liability. 
We find that the limitations placed by these 
courts upon the mitigating evidence they would consider 
violated the rule in Lockett. Just as the state may not 
15. 
by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any 
mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer, refuse to 
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating 
evidence. In this instance, it was as if the trial judge 
had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence 
Eddings proffered on his behalf. The sentencer, and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may find that 
relevant mitigating evidence is entitled to little weight. 
But they may not exclude such evidence from their 
consideration in the first place. 
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings 
offered was relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a 
youth of 16 years at the time of the murder. Evidence of 
a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is 
typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. See 
McGautha. Perhaps typically, such evidence is given 
little weight. But when the defendant was 16 years old at !' 
can be 1 it tle doubt that { 
' Q.,~ 
the time of the offense ) there 
evidence of 
~
a &I'Qlilbled family 
1\ 
~ ~ ~4 ~-...... ~..,... 
history 1\ and oi emotional 
disturbance is of the utmost relevance and importance. 
16. 
The trial judge recognized that youth must be 
considered a relevant mitigating factor. But youth is 
~~ 
more than a chronological fact. It is a condition of life 
~ 
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to 
psychological d~mage.J Te-conside-r Eddings' youth must be 
to consider not only his bare age but those aspects of his 
personal history and development that are of such 
importance precisely because he was so young. 8 
that Eddings' was 16 years old tells us little. 
The fact .~_.-·( 
The fact \ 
( 
that he was a ju~enile with severe emotional problems and \ 
with a· neglectful, perhaps v~olent, family background ) 
I 
. "" tells us a great deal. I On remand, ~the state courts 
.... 
must consider this evidence and weigh it against the 
evidence of the aggravating circumstances. 9 we do not 
weigh the evidence for them. We require only that they 
8Quote from Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention, National Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976. 
9Even were we uncertain that the Court of 
Criminal Appeals refused to consider the evidence of~ 'i mitigation as a matter of law we would still remand. A 
9 the very least, the opinion by that Court is ambiguous and in these circumstances a remand for clarification, i 
not for reconsideration of all the evidence in mitigation 




consider all of the relevant evidence proffered by Eddings 
in mitigation. 
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the 
extent that it sustains the imposition of the death 
penalty, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. 
11/17/81 lfpjvde Rider A, page 16 (Eddings) 
Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition 
that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally 
are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly, 
"during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
minors often lack the experience, perspective and judgment" 
expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, U.S. u.s. at 
(1979). In a word, even the normal 16-year old 
customarily lacks the maturity of adults. In this case, 
Eddings was not a normal 16-year old: he had been deprived 
of the care, concern and parental attention that children 
deserve. On the contrary, he was a juvenile with severe 
emotional problems, and had been raised in a neglectful and 
sometimes even violent family background. Moreover, there 
was testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional development 
were at a level several years below his chronological age • 
.. ' 
2. 
All of this is not to suggest an absence of responsibility 
for the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this 
case.* Rather, it is to say that although the chronological 
age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor, other 
circumstances make clear in this case the relevance also of 
the background and mental and emotional age of this 
defendant. 
*We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage 
increasingly in violent crime. Nor do we suggest an absence 
of legal responsibility. We are concerned here with the 
severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence 
imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed 
youth with a disturbed child's immaturity. 
dfl November 17, 1981 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Eddings--No. 80-5727 
80-5727 
I wonder if you might cast your eye over this draft to see if 
it's what you had in mind. I still need to add several footnotes, 
and it might be worthwhile to flesh out the discussion of youth as 
a mitigating circumstance either in footnote or text. 
I don't view the draft as an extension of Lockett or even really 
as a clarification of Lockett. Much rnore it is a defense of Lockett. 
I was hoping that through this approach the Chief might decide to 
reconsider his vote. Now that he has assigned himself the dissent, I 
don't suppose he will be inclined to shift. But I did write the draft 
with him in mind, as you will see. 
If you would prefer to wait to look at this draft until it 





David DATE: Nov. 17, 1981 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-5727 Eddings v. Oklahoma 
Your draft of 11/16 is excellent. 
Apart from quite minor editing, and the suggested 
revision of page 16, I have made no changes. 
I agree that we should "flesh 
of youth as a mitigating circumstance". 
out the discussion 
~ 
I done this to some 
A 
extent in my rider for page 16. There are other cases that 
you might take a look at in addition to my citation of 
Bellotti. I think Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in 
Danforth may have said something about youth, and possibly I 
did in my recent concurring opinion in the Utah abortion 
case. I cited Frankfurter in my Bellotti opinion. Feel 
entirely free to revise or edit what I have written, and 
perhaps supplement it in a footnote. 
We can be sure that the dissent will emphasize 
Eddings' statements and absence of remorse after the murder. 
I think it might be well to make a more specific reference 
to these at this time. 
You have indeed made excellent use of the 
authorities, and particularly Lockett. Although I have 
learned from experience not to be optimistic about the 
.~· 
2. 
change of votes, I think you have made it particularly 
difficult for some of the Brothers to dissent. 
I now suggest that you follow our customary 
procedure. Have the clerk you select as editor take a close 
look at form and substance. If there are substance changes, 
I would like to see them before we go to a Chambers Draft. 
When that is in hand, all five of us should take a close 
look. I view the case as important. I do not wish to sound 
like I have joined the school of "send 'em to Yale, and not 
to jail". I have a hunch that our system, with the Youth 
Offender ~ and "juvenile justice') is too lenient on many 
teenagers who persistently engage in violent crime. But 
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~ ( 5 fez L/ 9 ro_rJ fc-clJ 
Cert to Ok a Ct of Crim App 
(Brett fo ct) (Cornish and J I ) 
l3u,~~e.z ach concurring Sc(Jcua !"e '}__, 
State/criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr raises three challenges to his death 
sentence: (1) that one who was 16 years old at the time of the 
murder cannot be sentenced to death; (2) that the murder which petr 
commitled was not "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel;" and (3) 
.• 
refusal to provide funds for an investigator and a psychiatrist. 
2. FACTS and DECISION DELOW: In J\.1arch 1977, when he was 
I 
16 years old, petr took his brother's car and run away from horne 
"-with two friends and his sister. By all accounts, petr's horne was a 
tragic one. His parents had divorced when he was two, and he had 
spent several years moving back and forth between his mother's horne , 
his father's, and "group homes" run by the state. According to 
petr's testimony, his stepfather beat him and his mother was a 
prostitute. By the age of 14, petr had been charged with burglary 
and been made a ward of the juvenile court. When 15 years old, pe t r 
was charged with assault with intent to do bodily harm and was 
charged with another burglary. In March 1977, petr was living at 
home on probation, which petr broke by running away. 
While driving through Okla in this flight from home, petr 
and his friends stopped at a restaurant alongside the interstate 
highway. As petr was returning to the highway, he dropped a 
cigarette on the floor of the car and momentarily lost control of 
the car while picking the cigarette up. A cus t omer at the 
restaurant noticed petr's car momentarily swerve off the road, a nd 
he reported his observation to Patrolman Crabt r ee, of the Okla 
Highway Patrol, who happened also to be at the restaurant. Crabtr ee 
then pursued petr and eventually signaled to petr to pull off the 
road. One of petr's friends testified at trial that petr th e n said, 
"If the fucking cop harrasses me, I'll shoot him." As Crabtree 
approached petr's car, petr loaded one of thr ee guns he had taken 
from his mother's housew When Crabtree was about six feet from the 
(" 
car, petr stuck the shotgun out of his window and shot Crabtree . 
squarely in the chest. Petr immediately drove away. Crabtree died. 
After a hearing, the Okla juvenil~ ct certified that petr 
could be charged and tried as an adult. Petr does not raise any 
~
challenges to this hearing. Petr later pleaded nolo contendere to 
first degree murder. At a sentencing hearing, the state presented 
three highway patrolmen, the passengers in petr's car, some 
passersby on the highway, a medical examiner, and a firearms expert 
as witnesses. On his behalf, petr presented his juvenile of ficer, a 
ct-appointed psychologist, a professor of sociology, and a private 
psychiatrist. None of the three expert witnesses had inte rviewed 
petr for more than an hourr and they had interviewed him about a 
year earlier, before the certification hearing in the juvenile ct. 
The trial judge found three aggravating circumstances: (1) that the 
murder was "heinous, atrocious and cruel," (2) that it was committed 
for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, and (3) that petr 
const itutes R threat to society. The judge found one mitigating 
cir cumstance: that petr was only 16 years old at the time of the 
murder. 
The Okla Ct Crim App affirmed over petr's several 
contentions. Petr repeats the following three in this petn. 
First, the ct rejected petr's ar0ument that the death 
sentence violates the 8th Amencment when imposed upon one v1ho was 16 
years old at the time of the crime. In the ct's view, the 8th 
Amendment requ ires only that petr 's age be considered as a 
mitigating circumstancer but youth docs not bar the death sentence. 
The ct also noted that the juvenile ct had ccrt1r1ea pe-er Lu ::>1..a11u 
! trial as an adult, his youth notwithstanding. 
I, 
Second, the ct rejected petr's a~gument that his sentence 
was unconstitutional because of the vagueness of the aggravating 
circumstance that it was "heinous, atrocious and cruel." Noting 
that Crabtree had had no reason to treat this incident as anything 
more than a routine traffic stop, and therefore had no reason to 
prepare himself for a confrontation, the ct concluded that this was 
a cold-blooded murder which was "wicked," shockingly evil," and 
"designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference 
to ..• the suffering of others." 
Third, the ct rejected petr's argument that the State 
should have provided him with funds to pay for an investigator and a 
psychiatrist. Petr relied on an Okla statute that provides funds 
( for a public-defenders office, at county expense, in counties with 
populations of more than 200,000. (Okla has two counties of this 
size.) Public defenders in such counties are authorized to use 
county funds to hire investigators where necessary. In smaller 
counties, Okla statute does not provide for a public-defenders 
office. Rather, the statute provides that the cour~s may appoint 
counsel as necessary from the local bar and pay them fees from a 
court fund. Such appointed counsel are not authorized by statute, 
as public defenders are in larger counties, to hire investigators. 
·rhe ct in this case held that the distinction between counties is 
rational because larger counties have more indigent criminal 
defenders. For that reason, larger counties ~eed a permanent 
public-defenders office, and attendant staff, that smaller counties 
do not need. In any event, the ct noted that petr had pleaded noLO 
c contendere. Petr therefore did not need an investigator of facts. 
Nor, the ct concluded, did petr need fund s, for another psychi a trist, 
for petr had presented psychiatrists at the sentencing heari ng who 
testified on his behalf, as they had at the certification he a ring. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
{l) Petr contends th a t the imposition of a de ath senten~e 
upon one who was 16 years old at the time of his crime is c r ue l and 
unusual punishment. In support of his content i on that "child 
executions" are unconstitutional, petr notes the national 
recognition of the need for a juvenile justice system separa te from 
the criminal-justice system for adults. Petr also notes that three 
states {Nev., Tenn, Texas) statutorily bar exe cutions of those unde r 
18 years old. Petr also notes that only 20 ou t of 444 pri s oners on 
(~' death row throughout the nation were under 20 years old as of Dec 
----------
31, 1976. Finally, petr contends that this Ct emph asized the 
significance of age in considering a death sente nce in Roberts v. 
Louisianu., 431 U.S. 633, 637 {1976). 
In response, the State contends that youth should be a 
mitigating circumstance, as in this case, but shouid not be an 
absolute constitutional bar to the death sentence. 
{2) Petr contends that the ct below erred in holding that 
the ''especially heinous" circumstance is not unconstitutionally 
vague. In petr's view, there was nothing "especially heinous '' in 
this murder, for the shooting was not preceded by any tortu r e and 
Crabtree "presumably" died instantly. [There is no indication in 
the opinion of the Ct Crim App as to how quickly Crabtree died.] 
-
Petr further contends that this murder surely was less reprenenslDle 
(....... than the 'murder in Godfrey v. Geo~~, --- U.S. --- ( 19 80) . 
Finally, petr complains that the Ct Crim App affirmed the finding of 
this aggravating circumstance on the ground that the murder was 
"wicked" and "shockingly evil." These are not the words of the 
statute, petr contends. 
In response, the State notes that this Ct has not 
invalidated statutory aggravating circumstances such as this one. 
The State further contends that the facts of this case support the 
finding. 
(3) Petr contends that he was denied due process and 
equal protection by the trial ct•s refusal to provide him with funds 
to obtain a psychiatic examination and an investigator. Petr 
contends that such assistance was necessary to an effective defense. 
The expert witness whom he presented were ineffective, petr 
contends, because they had not examined him in over a year since the 
certification hearing. 
In response, the State notes that the Okla statute assures 
that every indigent criminal defendant receives a lawyer. In the 
State's view, the Constitution does not require that the states also 
provide expert witnesses. In any event, the State contends that 
petr was not prejudiced by the trial ct•s refusal in this case 
because petr did not need an investigator and because petr in fact 
had expert witnesses. 
4. DISCUSSION: I recommend a denial. So long as the 8th 
Amendment does not prohibit the death sentence, I see no sound basis 
for drawing a line under the 8th Amendment on the basis of age. Age 
must be considered as a mitigating circumstance , to be sure. See 
Roberts v. Louisiana, ~~· But the sentencing ct did conside r 
petr's age in mitigation in this case. Secbnd, the ques tion whether 
the facts of this case present an 11 especially he inous .. murder i s a 
question that this Ct, in the main, has decided to leave to the 
states. The decision of the Ct Crim App in thi s case does not 
warrant this Ct's review. Finally, petr has failed to show th a t 
Okla's method of providi ng indigent criminal defendants with counsel 
deprived him of assistance or experts. 
There is a response. 
02/27/81 Morgan Opin in petn 
GM 03/05/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
Re: No. 80-5727: Eddings v. Oklahoma: SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO 
Here is a summary of what I mentioned to you 
yesterday evening: 
(1) Petr has been re~esented by ~he_sa~e couns~ 
since the day he was arrested. Neither in this petn nor in his 
petn arising from his certification as an adult offender has 
petr raised any claim about the competency of his lawyer. 
(2) Oklahoma law allows an accused to plead nolo 
contendere to first-degree murder. Petr did so. Okla. law 
also provides that one who pleads nolo shall be sentenced by 
the trial court rather than by a jury. 
(3) Petr sought cert in 1978, raising several claims 
about the juvenile-court hearing in which he was certified to 
be tried as an adult. Over claims that he had been denied 
sufficient time to prepare for the hearing and a claim that he 
had a constitutional right to treatment as a juvenile, th~ 
Court denied cert. 436 u.s. 921 (No. 77-6504). /~ 
(4) Petr does not claim that he was denied any 
opportunity to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing 
hearing. Furthermore, the trial ct and the Ct Crim App 
expressly considered petr's youth in mitigation. 
(5) We cannot "GVR" on Godfrey v. Georgia, for the 
Olka Ct Crim App expressly considered Godfrey on petr's petn 
for rehearing, and it held that Godfrey did not require any 
change in its decision. 
In sum, I continue to recommend a denial. To be 
sure, I too find it difficult to believe that one so young 
~. 
could have murdered so callously if he understood the enormity 
of his actions. But the combined findings of the juvenile 
court and the sentencing judge stand against my disbelief. The 
~ 
juvenile court, in the cours~ of certifying petr to stand 
trial as an adult, credited the testimony of two expert 
witnesses who had examined petr. Those witnesses testified 
that petr understandsthe difference between right and wrong and 
understood the consequences of his actions when he shot the 
policeman. The sentencing judge heard and credited similar 
evidence. And, of course, both the juvenile court and the 
sentencing judge credited this testimony over the contradictory 
testimony from experts on petr's behalf. 
I look forward with great interest to seeing what the 
other Justices make of this case. 
A'"'r"g'"'u'e"d· .... (' .. . ~ :~ . 'j ·. ~9. ~ • ..A~;;~;_;~· : : : ::::~~::: No.B0-5727 · ········p~ -~· ~,- ~, 1QWf3, , --~ ·-· : ·~ 
Submitted . ............... , 19... 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 80-5727 - Eddings v. Oklahoma 
Because of my concern about the Court's action 
in this case, I have prepared the attached dissenting 
opinion. In all candor, however, I have not yet 




80-5727 - Eddings v. Oklahoma 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting . 
J-.~; l'O ,j Cnl vl ._, , ..j. 
Mr 0 Just ice Bre:. ,,,0 
Uro Justice Stewart 
f.fr 0 J·.1st ioe White 
Itr o Jtu~t 1ce Marshall 
ttr 0 !w.t5. ce Dl<.:.~'~JP.un 
r~r o Ju::;t1ce Po ~ ell 
Ur o J ustice R.::~bn.qu1st 
From! Mr. Justi ce Stevens 
C1:roulated1 MAR 1 8 '81 
Recirculat ed : -----
In 1977, at the age of sixteen, petitioner murdered an 
Oklahoma State Highway Patrol Officer . Following his arrest, 
petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. The trial 
court, after a hearing, granted the State's motion to certify 
petitioner to stand trial as an adult. That ruling was upheld on 
appeal, see In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340 (Okl. Crim. App. 1978), and 
this Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. 436 u.s. 
------921. Petitioner then entered a plea of nolo contendere to the 
charge of murder in the first degree.l After a hearing on 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court 
sentenced petitioner to death.2 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
1 Under Oklahoma law, the legal effect of a plea of nolo 
contendere is the same as that of a guilty plea. See-oKra. 
Stat., Tit. 22, § 513 (Supp. 1978); see also Okla. Stat., Tit. 
21, § 701.9 (Supp. 1978). 
2 The trial court found that three aggravating circumstances 
existed: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding 
or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (3) the 
defendant would constitute a continuing threat to society. These 
aggravating circumstances outweighed, in the trial court's 
No. 80-5727 
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Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence . See 
Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (1980). That court later granted 
a temporary stay of execu~ion . App. to Petn. for Cert. 21-22. 
Petitioner now requests that this Court issue a writ of 
certiorari, arguing primarily that imposition of the death 
penalty in his case would be cruel and unusual punishment 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.3 
The Eighth Amendment defines the outer limits on the 
severity of the punishment that a State may impose upon a 
criminal offender. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666-
667. The Amendment draws "its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society ." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plurality opinion). 
Because judges routinely confront the difficult responsibility of 
prescribing particular punishments for particular offenders, the 
_,-
evolution of those standards both affects and is affected by the 
performance of the judicial function.4 This case presents this 
judgment, the sole mitigating circumstance, petitioner's youth. 
3 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. 
Const., Arndt. 8. 
4 In this respect, the Eighth Amendment is comparable to the 
Due Process Clause. Because judges routinely confront procedural 
questions, the evolution of standards of procedural fairness both 
affects and is affected by the performance of the judicial 
function. In giving meaning to the words "due process of law," 
the Court has referred to the "flexibility and capacity for 
growth and adaptation [that] is the peculiar boast and excellence 
of the common law," Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530, 
and has firmly refused "to stamp upon our jurisprudence the 
No. 80-5727 
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Court with an exceptional opportunity--and in my opinion an 
obligation--to give particular meaning to those standards. The 
question that the case presents is whether "the evolving 
standards of decency" embodied in the Eighth Amendment are 
transgressed by the imposition of the death penalty as punishment 
for an offense committed by a sixteen-year-old juvenile. 
The Court's disposition of that question by denial of the 
petition for writ of certiorari is exceptional for two . reasons. 
First, the Court's action today is tantamount to a ruling on the 
merits because, unlike most votes on petitions for certiorari, it 
-:::.._ --is safe to assume that no Justice would vote to deny this 
petition if he had any doubt concerning the merits of the issue.5 
Second, it is surely exceptional for the highest court in any 
civilized nation to place its stamp of approval on the execution 
of a juvenile.6 
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and 
Persians." Id., at 529. 
5 The principal reason for not publishing or explaining 
dissents from denials of certiorari is therefore not applicable 
in this case. Cf. Singleton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
439 U.S. 940, 942-946 {Opinion of STEVENS, J.). 
6 In its effort to define the "evolving standards of decency" 
that give meaning to the Eighth Amendment, the Court in the past 
has examined the practices of other nations with respect to the 
punishment of criminals. See, ~~' Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 
584, 596, n. 10 {plurality opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. 86, 
102-103 {plurality opinion). In the present case, it should be 
noted that Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of the International Bill of Human Rights 
provides: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age ...• " United 
Nations, International Bill of Human Rights 23 (1978). Although 
~ · No. 8 0-5 7 2 7 
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These exceptional circumstances have induced me to record my 
dissent from the denial of certiorari in this case. My 
perception of the controlling constitutional standard persuades 
me that JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL are correct in their 
opinion that this death se~tence should be vacated. I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
Congress has not ratified the Covenant, petitioner informs us 
that it has been signed or ratified by 73 nations. Se e also 
Wei s sbrodt, U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 
Min n . L • Rev • 3 5 , 4 0 ( 19 7 8 ) • 
Of course, the practice in this country is of greater 
relevance than that in foreign nations. A number of states 
prohibit the execution of persons who were . below a specified age 
at the time of their offe nse. See, ~' Cal. Penal Code § 190.5 
(West Supp. 1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-46a (f) (Supp. 
1980); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.025 (1979) • And the statutes of 
many other states specify that an offender's youth is a 
mitigating circumstance to be considered in determining the 
propriety of the death penalty. See, ~' Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
921.141(6) (g) (West Supp. 1980); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 
413 (g) (5) (Supp. 1980); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2404 (j) (7) (Supp. 
1979). See generally Weissbrodt, supra, at 72-73, n. 210. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MONTY LEE EDDINGS v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
APPEAL FOR STATE OF OKLAHOMA 
No. 80-5727. Decided March--, 1981 
j UST!C:E STEVENS, dissenting. 
In 1977, at the age of sixteen, petitioner murdered an 
Oklahoma State Highway Patrol Officer. Following his ar-
rest, petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. The 
trial court, after a hearing, granted the State's motion to cer-
tify petitioner to stand trial as an adult. That ruling was up-
held on appeal, see In reM. E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. 
A pp. 1978), and this Court denied a petition for writ of cer-
tiorari. 436 U. S. 921. Petitioner then entered a plea of 
nolo contendere to the charge of murder in the first degree.' 
After ·a hearing on aggravating and mitigating circun1-
stances, the trial court sentenced petitioner to death." The 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner's 
conviction and sentence. See Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 
1159 ( 1980). That court later granted a temporary stay of 
execution. App. to Pet. for Cert. 21-22. Petitioner now 
requests that this Court issue a writ of certiorari, arguing 
primarily that imposition of the death penalty in his case 
would be cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the 
Eighth Amendment. ' 
'l,J nder Oklahoma law, the legal elfect of a plea or 11olo omtendrre is the 
same as that of a guilly plea. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, * 513 (Supp. 197H); 
see also Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.9 (Supp. l97H) . 
' The trial court found that 1 hree statutory aggravating circumstances / 
existed: (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel ; (2) the 
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful 
arrest or prosecution; and (3) the defendant would constitut e a continuing· 
threat to societ y. These aggr;11·ating circumstances outweighed, in the 
· trial court'sjudgment, the sole mitigating circumstance, petitioner's youth . 
. , .. Excessive hail shall not he ·required , nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inllicted ." U.S . Cons!. , ,\IJHit. 8. 
OP57271, March 19, 1981 DRB 
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The Eighth Amendment defines the outer limits on the 
severity of the punishment that a State may impose upon a 
criminal offender. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 
666-667. The Amendment draws "its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (plural-
ity opinion). Because judges routinely confront the diffi-
cult responsibility of prescribing particular punishments for 
particular offenders, the evolution of those standards both 
affects and is affected by the performance of the judicial 
function. 1 This case presents this Court with an excep-
tional opportunity-and in my opinion an obligation-to 
give particular meaning to those standards. The question 
that the case presents is whether "the evolving standards of 
decency" embodied in the Eighth Amendment are trans-
gressed by the imposition of the death penalty as punish-
ment for an offense committed by a sixteen-year-old 
juvenile. 
The Court's disposition of that question by denial of the 
petition for writ of certiorari is exceptional for two reasons. 
First, the Court's action today is tantamount to a ruling on 
the merits because, unlike most votes on petitions for certio-
rari, it is safe to assume that no .Justice would vote to deny 
this petition if he had any doubt concerning the merits of the 
issue. ~· Second, it is surely exceptional for the highest court 
1 In this respect, the Eighth Amendment is comparable to the Dne Pro-
cess Clause. Becausejudges routinely confront procedural qttestions, the 
evolution of standards of procedural fairness bOLh affects and is affected 
by the performance of the judicial fnnction. In giving meaning to the 
words "due process of law," the Court has referred to the "flexibility and 
capacity for growth and adaptation (that] is the peculiar boast and excel-
lence of the common law," Hurtado v. Califomia, I I 0 U.S. 5 I G, 530, and 
has firmly refused "to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeable-
ness attributed to the laws of the l\1edes and Persians." !d .. at 529. 
· The principal reason f(H· not publishing or explaining dissents from 
denials of certiorari is therefore not applicable in this case . CL Singleton 
v. Co111missionn of Internal Revenue, 439 U. S. 940, 942-946 (Opinion of 
STE\'ENS, .J.). 
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in any civilized nation to place its stamp of approval on the 
execution of a juvenile." 
These exceptional circumstances have induced me to 
record my dissent from the denial of certiorari in this case. 
My perception of the controlling constitutional standard 
persuades me that j USTJCE BRENNAN and j USTJCE MARSHALL 
are correct in their opinion that this death sentence should 
be vacated. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
'' In its effort to dellne the "evolving standards of decency" that give 
meaning to the Eighth Amendment, the Court in the past has examined 
the practices of other nations with respect to the punishment of criminals. 
See , r'. g .. Cohn v. Gemgia , 433 U.S. 584, 596, n . 10 (plurality opinion); 
TrojJ v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-103 (plurality opinion) . In the present 
case, it should be noted that Article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of the International Bill of Human Rights pro-
vides : "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age .... " United Nations , International 
Bill of Human Rights 23 ( 1978). Although Congress has not ratilled the 
Covenant, petitioner informs us that it has been signed or ratilled by 73 
nations. See Weissbrodt, U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Cov-
enants, 63 Minn. L. Rev . 35, 40 ( 1978); see . generally International J 
Human Rights Treaties, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations , 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980). 
Of' course, the practice in this country is of greater relevance than that 
in foreign nations. A number of states prohibit the execution of persons 
who were below a specified age at the time of their offense . See , e. g., 
Cal. Penal Code §I 90.5 (West Supp. 1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§53a-46a (f) (Supp. 1980); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.025 (1979) . And the 
statutes of many other states specify that ~m offender's youth is a mitigat-
ing cirCLimstance to be considered in determining the propriety of the 
death penalty. See, e. g., Fla . Stat. Ann. §921.141 (6) (g) (West Supp. 
1980) ; Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27 , §413 (g) (5) (Supp. 1980); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § :19- 2404 (j) (7) (Supp. I 979). See generally Weissbrodt, supra, at 
72-73 , n . 210. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MONTY LEE EDDINGS v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT ·OF 
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA 
No. 80-5727. Decided March -, 1981 
JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
This case presents the extraordinary situation of a juvenile, 
now just 20, sentenced to death for a murder he committed 
when he was only 16 years of age. The trial and subsequent 
proceedings in the Okl homa courts appear to have been 
entirely regular, and I have no doubt as to petitioner's guilt. 
My concern arises solely from the imposition of capital pun-
ishment for a crime committed by a 16-year-old youth. 
Whatever may be said about the capability of some juveniles 
of this age knowingly to commit shocking crimes, I think a 
line should be drawn somewhere with respect to the imposi-
tion of death as a permissible penalty.1 
In my view, this case never should have been allowed to 
come this far without the most serious consideration of a 
grant of clemency by the appropriate state authority. But 
the case is here/ and I believe the question whether some age 
limit properly should be drawn under the Eighth Amend-
ment, below which capital punishment would be cruel and 
unusual, deserves our plenary consideration. Moreover, one 
1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the In-
ternational Bill of Human Rights draws a line at 18 years of age. Arti-
cle VI thereof provides: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for 
crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age . ... " United Na.-
tionl:!, International Bill of Human Rights 23 (1978). To be sure, Con-
gress has not ra.tified this convenant, but it reflects a judgment widely 
held by civilized peoples. 
2 Petitioner set>ks review on the ground that in his case the sentence of 
death would constitute cruel and unusual punhohment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. 
2 EDDtNe>~ v. C>KLAHOMA 
may hope with reason that during the period of our review 
the issue will be mooted by an act of clemency. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MONTY LEE EDDINGS v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA 
No. 80-5727. Decided March -, 1981 
JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
This case presents the extraordinary situation of a juvenile, 
now just 20, sentenced to death for a murder he committed 
when he was only 16 years of age. The trial and subsequent 
proceedings in the Oklahoma courts appear to have been 
entirely regular, and I have no doubt as to petitioner's guilt. 
My concern arises solely from the imposition of capital pun-
ishment for a crime committed by a 16-year-old youth. 
Whatever ma.y be said about the capability of some juveniles 
of this age knowingly to commit shocking crimes, I think a 
line should be drawn somewhere with respect to the imposi-
tion of death as a permissible penalty. 1 
In my view, this case never should have been allowed to 
come this far without the most serious consideration of a 
grant of clemency by the appropriate state authority. But 
the case is here,2 and I believe the question whether some age 
limit properly should be drawn under the Eighth Amend-
ment, below which capital punishment would be cruel and 
unusual, deserves our plenary consideration. Moreover, one 
1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of t.he In-
ternational Bill of Human Rights draws a. line at 18 years of age. Arti-
cle VI thereof provides: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for 
crimes corn.mitted by persons below 18 years of age .... " United Na.-
tions, International Bill of Human Rights 23 (1978). To be sure, Con-
gress has not ra.tified this convenant, but it reflects a. judgment widely 
held by civilized peoples. 
2 Petitioner seeks review on the ground that in his case the sentence of 
death would constitute cruel and unusual puni':ihment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. 
2 EDDINetS v . OKLAHOMA 
may hope with reason that during the period of our review 
the issue will be mooted by an act of clemency. 
Accordingly, I would grant the petition for certiorari. 
<.:ourt ................... . votea on .................. , lY .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 80-5727 
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Motion of Petitioner for 
Appointment of Counsel 
Petr's counsel, Jay C. Baker, requests appointment as counsel 
for petr. On Apr. 6, the Court . granted petr leave to proceed ifp 
and granted cert limited to the first question raised by the petn. 
Applicant has been a member in good standing of the Bar of this Court 
since 1973. Applicant has represented petr since his arrest for the 
crime which eventually led to his sentence of death. It is the desire 
of petr that applicant be appointed as his counsel. 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: David Levi 
October 24, 1981 
No. 80-5727: Eddings v. Oklahoma 
Question Presented 
Whether the eighth amendment prohibits the 
execution of a youth, convicted of first degree murder, who 
was sixteen-years-old at the time of the crime. 
I. Facts and Decision Below 
The facts are uncontested. I repeat them in perhaps 
excessive detail. On April 4, 1977, Monty Lee Eddings, a 
2. 
sixteen year old youth, went to the home of his fourteen year 
old friend, Gary Molt, and proposed that the two of them 
runaway from their Camdenton, Missouri homes. Monty was upset 
because his father had become angry with him the night before 
when Monty was unloading i terns from the family van. Gary 
agreed to go, and the two went to Eddings 1 home where they 
took two shotguns and a rifle. Eddings suggested that they 
could use the guns if they ran out of money, and he sawed the 
barrel off of one of the shotguns. They put the guns in his 
brother's Volkswagen and took off for Joplin, Missouri, where 
they planned to pick up Eddings' sisters. 
At Joplin, the boys picked up Eddings' fourteen year 
old sister, Rhonda, and her fifteen year old friend, Terrie 
Clevenger. The four teenagers set out driving in a 
southwesterly direction on Interstate 44. None had a driver's 
license, none had a destination in mind. They drove aimlessly 
stopping only to pick up a hitchhiker at the Oklahoma turnpike 
gates and to purchase soft drinks at a Howard Johnsons. As 
they were leaving the Howard Johnsons and re-entering the 
highway, Eddings momentarily lost control of the car, swerved 
off the road, into a ditch, and then back onto the highway. A 
service station attendant saw this happen and reported the 
incident to Officer Crabtree who was 
Howard Johnson's. The Officer left 
investigate. 
having coffee at the 
shortly thereafter to 
3. 
Some twenty minutes later, the Officer caught up to 
the youthful caravan and signalled them to stop. Eddings 
became angry saying if the "pig tried to stop him, he was 
going to blow him away" and that "he was tired of being 
hassled by the pigs." He brought the car to a stop. He 
reached behind the seat, picked up the shotgun, and loaded it 
with a single shell. When the Officer approached, he fired, 
hitting the Officer in the chest. He drove off, shaking, 
mumbling "mumbo-jumbo," saying "I would rather have shot an 
Officer than go back to where I live." He told the others to 
throw the guns out of the car, and he continued driving. They 
were apprehended by the highway patrol shortly thereafter. 
Officer Crabtree was dead. 
Sheriff's 
custody. 
Eddings was arrested and taken to the Creek County 
Department where he was questioned and held in 
He stood for an hour or two staring at the wall. At 
one point he looked over his shoulder at the officers and 
stated that "if he was loose ••• he would shoot [them] all." 
Later that evening when the officer refused to turn off the 
light in his cell Eddings threatened the Officer: "Now I have 
shot one of you people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn 
this light out." 
Eddings was certified to stand trial as an adult. 
The court found that he was "capable of knowing right from 
wrong, and to be held accountable for his acts." 1974 Okla. 
Sess. Laws 570, ch. 272, §2. The certification was affirmed 
4. 
on appeal and this court denied cert. At trial, Eddings 
entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of murder in 
the first degree. A sentencing hearing was then held on the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. At the hearing, 
Eddings presented evidence of his troubled youth. 
Eddings' parents were divorced when he was five, and 
until he was fourteen he lived with his mother, an alcoholic 
of loose repute. He lived without any rules or supervision. 
By the time he was fourteen he could no longer be controlled 
and his mother sent him to live with his father. Monty's 
father and stepmother were thrown into turmoil by his addition 
to their family. His father held a steady job--a butcher in a 
supermarket--while his stepmother was a school teacher who had 
a good relationship with Monty. But they, too, could not 
control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to 
physical punishment. His parole officer testified that Monty 
was scared and bitter, that his father overreacted and used 
excessive punishment. v At age fourteen he was adjudicated a 
delinquent on four counts of burglarly in the second degree 
and stealing, and one count of tampering with a motor vehicle. 
He was placed on probation but some months later was again in 
trouble for an assault and for mail box vandalim. He was ... ~ .. 
placed in a group home, did well for a time, but was then 
again adjudged delinquent for several thefts. This last 
delinquency occurred four months before the murder. 
Their 




on Eddings' behalf • . / 
had a "sociopathic 
....--- - ...._, 
personality" and that his mental age was several years below 
.....- .__... 
that of his chronological age. There was testimony that Monty 
suffered from rootlessness and that he never recovered from 
his parents' divorce. One psychologist testified that in 
killing Officer Crabtree Monty was in reality seeking revenge 
against the police officer who married his mother after his 
parents were divorced. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge 
sentenced Eddings to death. He found three aggravating 
circumstances: first, the crime was "heineous, atrocious and 
cruel"; second, the crime was commit ted for the purpose of 
avoiding lawful arrest or prosecution; and third the court 
found that Monty's threatening statements to the officers 
after he was taken into custody indicated, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that there was a strong likelihood that if released, 
Eddings would pose a continuing threat of violence to society. 
As to mitigating circumst~ces, the court considered 
~ 
Eddings' youth but not hi~ ~mily backgr~nd: ~ 
"And I want ... all concerned persons to know, in /-~L-. --· /'1 
this particular case I have given very serious ~~~~ . n 
consideration to the youth of the Defendant when 
this particular crime was committed. Should I fail 
to do this, I think I would not be carrying out my 
duty. On the other hand, the Court cannot be 
persuaded entirely by the youthfulness [sic] of the 
fact that the youth was sixteen years old when this 
heineous crime was committed. Nor can the Court in 
following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact 
of this young man's violent background. So not --
finding any_ mitigation other than the youthfulness, 
and fai ling t o ffnd that it has sufficiently 
softened the aggravating circumstances that the 
Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court 
has no alternative in this particular case other 
than to sentence Monty Lee Eddings to death." 
6. 
The case was automatically appealed to the court of criminal 
appeals where the sentence was affirmed. 
The court of appeals found that there was no eighth 
amendment ban against imposition of the death sentence on a 
juvenile. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the amendment 
requires only that youth be considered as a mitigating 
circumstance. Although no one had ever been executed in 
Oklahoma who was under age 18 when the crime was committed, 
the capital punishment of a 16-year old could not be 
considered either cruel or unusual. It was not "unusual" 
because in a 1924 case the Oklahoma court stated that the 
"death penalty should not be imposed against a boy under the 
age of 14 years convicted of murder, unless it clearly appears 
that the juvenile offender was a person with a sense of 
reponsibility . equal to that of an ordinary person of the 
age 16 years." It was not cruel because capital punishment 
was not abhorred by public sentiment, nor would the execution 
cause extreme pain and suffering. Incredibly, the court never 
asked whether the "evolving standards of a maturing society" 
condemn not capital punishment in general but the capital 
punishment of one so young. 
7. 
Turning to the specific facts of the case, the court 
of appeals found that the trial judge had correctly weighed 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court found 
that each of the three aggravating circumstances had been 
properly found. The crime was "especially heinous, atrocious 
and cruel"; the victim was a police officer who had no 
warning that he was in danger. The crime was "committed for 
the purpose of avoiding ... a lawful arrest or prosecution"; 
the facts of the case support the conclusion that Eddings' 
shot the officer to avoid being returned to Missouri. 
Finally, Eddings would "constitute a continuing threat to 
society"; he made threatening remarks to the officers while 
in custody and he had an extensive juvenile record including 
crimes against persons. 
These aggravating factors were very serious, 
outweighing the mitigating fact of his youth. The court of 
appeals joined the trial judge in rejecting evidence of 
Eddings' upbringing or mental state as mitigating factors: 
The petitioner also argues his mental state at 
the time of the murder. ij_e stresses his family 
history in saying he was suffering from severe 
ps ych oLogical and emotional disorders, and that the 
killing was in actuality an inevitable product of 
the way he was raised. There is no doubt that the 
petitioner has a personality disorder. But all the 
evidence tends to show that he knew the difference 
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the 
trigger, and that is the test of criminal 
responsibility in this State. For the same ~~ .. d .. 
reason the petil.ioner 's f C!I!! i .ls-. histQ_ry is useful in L--::::f~ 
explaining wny he E>ehaved the way he did, but it · ---, 
does not excuse his behavior." 
.... 
8. 
Finding that the sentence of death was not imposed under the 
influence of passion, that the evidence supported the judge's 
finding of aggravating circumstances, and that the sentence of 
death was not excessive or disproportionate, the court of 
appeals affirmed the death sentence. 
II. Analysis 
The Court granted cert in this case to determine 
whether the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of 
capital punishment on a juvenile. I will address that 
question first. My tentative conclusion is that the eighth 
amendment does not place a per se bar to the capital 
punishment of juveniles, although certainly there are 
arguments the other way. Having reached this conclusion, I 
would suggest that the Court not reach this eighth amendment 
question at all: for the Court to hold that contemporary 
standards do not condemn the capital punishment of a juvenile 
is not merely to describe these standards, it is also, 
inevitably, to fix the standard and to approve it. 
However, I would recommend that the Court overturn 
this death sentence. It is apparent from the record that 
neither the trial judge nor the court of appeals considered -I I ' ' the full range of mitigating circumstances present in this 
c: se--parti: ularly .. Eddings Z'l1amily background an~motional -





weight in the case of a juvenile offender. ~e~~
say that these mitigating circumstances are part and parce ~ o 
-------------------------------------------------
the more gene:_:a-:l~m~i~t~l~·g~a~t~in~g~c~i~r~c_u=~-s~t~a~~ce o_f __ youth. The Court 
in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 u.s. 586 (1978), and Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1976), has held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer consider the 
full range of possibly mitigating circumstances. The lower 
courts simply did not do so here. 
b~ 
Nor do I think that a remand on Lockett would be a ~
futile exercise, and that the state courts would simply re-~ 
hA-
impose the death penalty. That is possible, of course, but as~ 
the fact summary indicates, the aggravating circumstances in 
this case are quite shaky; I think that there is a good 
chance that on a remand the trial court will impose a life 
sentence. In sum, I recommend the equivalent of a grant, 




The Eighth Amendment: Is There a Per Se 
Prohibition on the Capital Punishment of Juveniles? 
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 173 (1976), the 
Court described the eighth amendment inquiry as a twofold one. 
First, the amendment encompasses "the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." This 
requires "an assessment of contemporary values concerning the 
infliction of a challenged sanction." Contemporary values are 
10. 
distilled by looking to history and to the actions of 
legislatures, courts, and juries. Second, and regardless of 
public perception, the Court may insist that a penalty accord 
with "the dignity of man." At the least, this requires that 
the punishment not be excessive: it may not inflict 
unnecessary pain, and it may not be grossly out of proportion 
to the severity of the crirne. 1 
Recognizing that adoption of a per se rule against 
the capital punishment of juveniles will "[encroach] upon an 
area squarely within the historic prerogative of the 
legislative branch--both state and federal--to protect the 
citizenry through the designation of penalties for 
prohibitable conduct," Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 418 
1In ~;raharn v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977), you 
described the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence: 
"These decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause circumscribes the criminal process in three ways: First, 
it limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those 
convicted of crimes, Estelle v. Gamble, [incarceration without 
medical care]; Trop v. Dulles, [expatriation for desertion]; 
second, it proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the crime, e.g., Weems v. United States,[l5 years' 
imprisonment and other penalties for falsifying an official 
document]; and third, it imposes substantive limits on what can 
be made criminal and punished as such, e.g., Robinson v. 
California, [incarceration as a criminal for addiction to 
narcotics]." 
It is not precisely clear to me where the per se rule 
would fit in this eighth amendment analysis. The best horne, I 
think, would be under the first heading you list above--the kind 
of punishment. Perhaps, too, one could argue that the death 
penalty is "grossly disproportionate" when levied upon a 
juvenile. 
11. 
~J_- rl ,_ • f) 1 
/,.-- '"'u-t ~ 
(Powell, J., dissenting), the Court will give greatest weight 
to the first branch of the eighth amendment inquiry-- the 
objective indicia of contemporary values. I now turn to some 
of these objective indicia. 
1. Common Law 
At common law, children under 7 were conclusively 
presumed to be incapable of forming criminal intent and thus 
could not be convicted of any felony. A child between 7 and 
14 was presumed to be incapable of forming criminal intent but 
the presumption was rebuttable by a showing to the jury that 
the child could distinguish between right and wrong and did 
understand the nature and illegality of his act. The 
presumption was extremely strong at age 7 and diminished 
gradually, disappearing at age 14. A juvenile over 14 was 
treated as an adult. 
'-- ____..... 
Thus, the common law placed no absolute barrier 
before the imposition of the death penalty upon children under 
14. And there is some evidence that the sentence of death was -
imposed fairly frequently on juveniles in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. However, execution of the sentence on juveniles 
under the age of 14 appears to have been extremely rare. 
According to one researcher, only two children under the age 
of 14 were executed in the United States in the period 1806 to 
1882, and both were slave children. 
In England no person under the age of 18 has been 
executed since 1887. The Children Act, 1908, provided that no 
person under 16 years of age at the time of conviction should 
be executed. In 1933 the provision was extended to persons 
under 18 at the time of conviction and then in 1948 to 
under 18 at the time when the offence was committed. 
2. Statistics in the Modern Period 
According to Eddings' brief there were as of May 1, 
1981, 63 defendants on death row who were juveniles under the 
age of 20 at the time of the crime. Of these 17 were under -- ---
the age of 18 at the time of the crime; six were under the age -- --of 17. - Eddings makes a fairly persuasive case that the 
execution of juveniles has steadily declined in the modern 
period. Using the best available figures on the age at the 
time of execution, Eddings has compiled a set of statistics 
for the period 1864-1967: 
Age 16 17 18 19 Total 
1864-1939 6 22 39 47 114 
1940-49 7 13 17 21 58 
J..;Jo 
1950-54 0 2 2 10 14 
1955-59 0 2 5 2 9 
1960-67 0 1 0 1 2 
According to this data, the last time someone under the age of ~ 
18 was put to death was in 1961 in Alabama. The youngest 
juvenile executed in recent years was a 14 year old who was 
sent to the electric chair in South Carolina. No white 
juvenile under age 18 has been executed since 1948. The above 
figures would appear to show a marked decline in the 
imposition of capital punishment on juveniles in the course of 
this century. 
3. Legislative Approaches (_ 1 "1 :1 'f-) 
According to the parties 34 states now have death 
penalty statutes. Of these 34, 8 prohibit the execution of ~&..,J-
S~ 
per sons under 18 at the time of the offense. These include _ ~1-
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, 
u-ud..e...-New 
/Rf 
Mexico, New Hampshire, and Kentucky (effective 1982). In 
addition Nevada imposes a prohibition at age 16, while Texas 
sets its limit at age 17. Thus, 9 out of the 34 states 
permitting capital punishment would not allow the execution of 
14. 
Eddings, a 16-year old. Another way of putting this, is that 
25 states would, and 25 states would not, permit Eddings' 
-------------------
execution. That's an even split. Of the 25 states permitting 
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, at least 22 of 
them explicitly denominate youth as a mitigating factor. 
At the federal level, S. 1401 was introduced in 1974 
to conform the federal capital punishment law to the 
requirements of Furman. The Bill precluded capital punishment 
for all defendants who were under 18 at the time of the crime. 
The Bill passed the Senate but died in the House. 
S. 114, a new effort to re-write the federal death ----
provision, is now before the Senate. It was reported 
v 
favorably out of the judiciary committee on June 9, 1981. 
Unlike S. 1401, under the terms of this Bill, the fact that 
the defendant was less than 18 at the time of the crime is 7 
only a mitigating factor--it does not place an absolute bar to 
the death penalty. 
4. The Model Penal Code 
The Model Penal 
-pi.Df ~I I 
/ 
Code death statute states an 
exclusion for defendants "under 18 years of age at the time of 
the commision of the crime." §210. 6 (1} (d). The ALI has never 
taken a position on whether the death penalty should or should 





oppose the use of this sanction in the case of juvenile 
murderers: 
••.• there is at least one class of murder for which 
the death sentence should never be imposed. This 
si tua €Ton ! s mur der by juveniles. The ' Institute 
believes that civilized societies will not tolerate 
the spectacle of execution of children, and this 
opinion is confirmed by the American experience in 
punishing youthful offenders. Subsection (1) (d) 
therefore excludes the possibility of capital 
punishment where the actor was under 18 years of age 
at the time of the homicide. Or co urse, any bright 
line of this sort is somewhat arbitrary, and many 
juveniles of lesser years have the physical 
capabilites and mental ingenuity to be extremely 
lethal. The Institute debated a motion to lower the 
age of exclusion to 14 but rejected that proposal on 
the ground that, however dangerous some children may 
be, the death penalty should be reserved for mature 
adults. It should also be noted that 18 is the 
limit of juvenile court jurisdiction contemplated in 
Section 4.10 of the Code •••. The Institute defeated 
a motion to delete [section (1) (d)] altogether and 
relegate the offender's age to evaluation as one of 
several mitigating factors. This decision reflects 
the view that no juvenile should be executed. 
5. State Cases 
/i L/ 
Eddings cites to a number of cases in which state 
courts of appeal have overturned a trial court's imposition of 
a death sentence upon a juvenile. These cases arise in states 
that permit the sentence of death for a juvenile but require 
that youth be considered as a mitigating circumstance. See 
Bracewell v. State, So.2d (Ala. Cr. App. 1980); State 
v. Maloney, 464 P.2d 793 (Ariz. 1970); Vasil v. State, 373 
16. 
So.2d 465 (Fla. 1979); Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 
1979); State v. Stewart, 250 N.W.2d 849 (Neb. 1977); 
Commonwealth .v Green, 151 A.2d 241 (Pa. 1959). Cf. People v. 
Wilkins, 344 N .E. 2d 724 (Ill. 1976) (court reduces murder 
sentence); People v. Hiemel, 372 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1975) (same); 
People v. Martinson, 312 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970) (same); Ezell v. 
State, 489 P.2d 781 (Okla.Cr.App. 1971) (same); Fryrear v. 
Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1974) (life sentence without 
parole is cruel and unusual punishment when applied to a 
juvenile). 
On the other hand, there are over 60 juveniles on ~ .. ~ 
death row, and the state courts have upheld the death ~ 
sentences of several of these juveniles. See High v. State, 
276 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. 1981); State v. Prejean, 379 So.2d 240 (La. 
1979(; State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979); State v. 
Valencia, 602 P.2d 807 (1979). 
6. Juvenile Court Systems 
The establishment of juvenile court systems and the 
Federal Youth Corrections Act--which applies to youths of ages 
16-22--indicate a recognition that juvenile criminals are not 
mature adults and should not be punished as if they were. Yet 
having said this, we must recognize that the states do treat 
the juvenile violent offender--particularly the juvenile 
murderer--as a special case. By permitting the criminal 
courts to assume concurrent jurisdiction over violent juvenile 
offenders, the states appear to place a limit on their 
solicitude for the juvenile offender. 
7. Academic and Professional Commentary 
On the whole the academic and professional 
commentary appears to condemn the execution of children. 
Expressions of outrage are easy to come by. Thus, a 1962 New 
York Times article, reports that "[t]he right to inflict death 
on yongsters drew sharp condemnation at a recent University of 
Chicago conference on "Justice for the Child." More than 
seventy of the naton's leading juvenile court jurists, 
attorneys, probation officers, educators, welfare and social 
workers at a seminar expressed outrage 'that any state retains 
the power to execute a minor. I II ~~ 
-
On the other hand, there is a recognition in the 
,, .... 
literature that the problem of violent juvenile offenders has -become increasingly serious. Thus, according to figures 
assembled by the National Advisory Committee of Criminal 
Justice in a 1976 report, youths of 17 years of age and under 
. h . . h ~ 1n t e c1t1es t ey ~account for u_3 c:_f all felony arrests; 
account for nearly 1/2 of all felony arrests. They account~ 
d. ~~~h 
for 10% of homicide arrests, 19.4% of rape offenses, and 55% '~ 
of auto thefts. From 1960 to 1974 there has been a 241.4% ltJ7a ~ 
increase in the number of male violent crime offenders under ~ 
~k 
18. 
the age of 18 and a 419.2 % increase of female offenders in 
the same age group. The Report notes that that "there has 
been a marked increase in rates of violent crimes by 
juveniles. Evidence also indicates that a large number of 
juveniles appear to be chronic law violators. There seems to 
.... -----"'--'" -be every indiction that a small segment of the juvenile 
population is responsible for a highly disproportionate number 
of the delinquent acts committed by juveniles. This is 
especially true for delinquent acts of a serious nature. The 
juvenile justice system is, at present, not adequately 
---------~----~ 
equipped to deal with the growing tide of youthful violence or 
with the violent or repeated offender." Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, ~eport of the Task Force on Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, National Advisory 
Committee on Crimninal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976, page 
13. 
The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing 
Policy Toward Young Offenders recognizes the problem of the 
youthful violent offender and offers the following guidance on 
sentencing: 
"Crimes against the person test the limits of a 
sepa_rate social polic~ to_wara youth cr1me 1n the 
crrffii na1 cour f . The T ask Force is una nimous in 
suggesting that the maximum sentencing options be 
significantly lower for violent young offenders than 
those for adults convicted of comparable crimes •..• 
The Task Force is divided on the question of whether 
offenders under twenty-one should ever be subject to 
sentences of over five yers for any crime short of 
murder."l6 "Murder remains the hardest of the hard 
cases. The young offender who dominates or commits 
an intentional killing is the ultimate test of the 
limits of diminished responsibility. The Task Force 
agreed that maximum sanctions for young offenders 
snould be lower than those for adults. The 
pr1n1c1ple of diminished responsibility makes life 
im risonment and death enalties ina ro riate in 
cases." The Task Force recommends that 
_s_e_n...,..t_e_n_c.:...e.:...s..::....;;...;.::..o_,._f over five years for offenders under 
eighteen convicted of murder and sentences exceeding 
ten years for offenders between eighteen and twenty-
one be confined to cases where the offender is 
responsible for taking more than one life or has a 
substantial history of life-threatening violent 
offenses." page 17. 
Confronting Youth Crime, Report of the Twentieth 
Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward 
Young Offenders {1978) {includes background paper by 
Franklin E. Zimring) 
19. 
But while the academics and professionals seem to 
agree that juveniles should not be put to death, they are less 
able to agree on the age at which this prohibition should be ~ 
. ~-
set. Thus, the Standard Juvenile Court Law of 1959, a p1ece  
of model criminal legislation prepared by the National Council ~~ 
~ 
on Crime and Delinquency, sets the childhood line at under 16. 
The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force sets the line at age 21 
although cautioning that "[t]he Task Force is convinced that 
no single age during mid-adolescence should be used as a sharp 
dividing line for sentencing policies." This sentiment is 
echoed in the background paper by Frederick Zimring, law 
professor at Chicago: "it is clear that any system that uses a 
simple 'magic birthday' to determine the boundary of youth for 
purposes of criminal justice policy is arbitrary and in sharp 
contrast to the insights of developmental psychology and 
20. 
common sense." p. 32. Eighteen is the age picked by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see 
below, and eighteen seems to be the line drawn in establishing 
juvenile court jurisdiction in most states. 
8. International Treaty 
Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights does not abolish capital punishment but it does forbid ._.___ 
the death penalty for youths under 18 and for pregnant women. 
The American Convention on Human Rights similarly forbids the 
capital punishment of offenders who were under the age of 18 -
at the time of the crime. According to Eddings 7 3 countries 7 3 
~~ set a limit on capital punishment at age 18, while virtually 
all of the Western and Eastern European countries either 
prohibit capital punishment entirely or draw a line at age 18. 
There does seem to be an overwhelming consensus among the 
civilized and not so civilized nations that the execution of 
persons under the age of 18 is abhorrent. 
Yet the cogency of this evidence of international 
feeling is undercut by the fact that the United States has yet 
to sign either of the treaties listed above. Indeed, when 
President Carter sent the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights to the Congress for ratification he proposed that the 
Covenant be ratified with a reservation to Article 6 that 
--
.......... 
would preserve the right of the United States to impose 
capital punishment on any person--including juveniles. 
9. Conclusion 
I reluctantly conclude from the above that there is 
no consensus in this country against the capital punishment of ~ - -- ~· 
juveniles under the age of 18. ·-Although th·e--_p_uni shment has 
been meted out to juveniles only infrequently, there are over 
60 juveniles now on death row. Despite the Model Penal Code 
and th~m~c-;it~ r::ure, · th~ajority of states permitting 
c~pital ~hm~~~so __eer.mi t its impositio~~n juveniles, 
listing youth only as a mitigating factor. Th~test federal 
death bill similarly treats youth as a mitigating factor but 
' ~---------------------------~--------~-----------not as an absolute bar. The problem of the juvenile violent 
offender is receiving increasing public attention, and my 
impression is that, if anything, th~ublic favors harsher 
treatment of juvenile public offenders. See New York Juvenile 
Justice Reform Act of 1978, Ch. 481, 1978 N.Y. Laws §48 (13, 
14, and 15 year old violent offenders to be treated as 
adults). 
I think you could write a principled opinion that J ~ - ---. 
contemporary standards condemn the imposition of capital 
punishment on juveniles. But you would be placing the Court ~ ___... 
in a leadership role and somewhat in advance of public opinion 
in this country. Given that the execution of juveniles is a 
....... 
rare event and that all states consider youth to be a 
mitigating factor, it may not be necessary for the Court to 
get involved in this debate. Moreover, the creation of a per 
se rule in this area would have some problems of its own. 
Although 18 is the obvious age to pick in light of current 
juvenile court statutes, voting laws, etc., it is not clear 
from current psychological or sociological literature that 18 
v 
is a developmental watershed. As you noted in dissent in Fare 
v. Michael Co., 442 u.s. 707 (1979): 
"Minors who become embroiled with the law range from 
the very young up to those on the brink of majority. 
Some of the older minors become fully 'street-wise,' 
hardened criminals, deserving no greater 
consideration than that properly accorded all 
per sons suspected of crime. Other minors are more 
of a child than an adult. As the Court indicted in 
In re Gault ••. the facts relevant to the care to be 
exercised in a particular case vary widely. " 
Finally, the choice of any age is going to lead to peculiar 
cases--the youth who is 18 and a day at the time of the crime. 
Given all of the above and the deference that the 
Court desires to give the states in matters dealing with 
sentencing, I cannot recommend that the Court establish a per 
se rule against the imposition of the death penalty on 
juveniles under the age of 18 at the time of the offense. 
On the other hand, I would not recommend that the 
Court write an opinion which states that the execution of J ~ 
juveniles is not prohibited by the eighth amendment. I fear 
that such an opinion would not be understood to be merely 
23. 
descriptive of contemporary standards, but would be seen as an 
endorsement of these standards. I think that the Court should 
not expend its moral capital in this way, particularly when it ---------------"'-"-
is unnecessary to do so and when the effect of the Court's 
decision may be to retard a movement to a more civilized 
standard. In short, I suggest that the Court should not reach tv(~ 
the eighth amendment question it took the case to decide. ~
~~ 
B. Youth as a Mitigating Circumstance ~ 7~~-:­
~&--~~ 
~ 
Should the court reject the eighth amendment per se 
argument, Eddings argues that the sentence must yet be 
overturned. He argues first that the sentence is 
disproportionate and excessive in violation of the eighth 
amendment, and second he argues that the lower courts erred by 
refusing to consider his violent family background and 
emotional instability as mitigating circumstances. 
Eddings quite properly argues that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating factors in this case would seem to 
tip toward leniency. The courts below found three aggravating 
circumstances. The first was that Eddings had killed a police 
officer. There is no question but that this was an 
aggravating circumstance. The other two are far more 
questionable. On the basis of Eddings' two threatening 
statements to the officers while in custody, and on the basis 
of his one juvenile assault, which according to Eddings' 
probation officer was in the nature of a street fight, the 
trial court found that Eddings would "constitute a continuing 
threat to society." On the basis that Eddings did not want to 
be returned to his home in Missouri, the court found that the 
murder was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or 7 
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." Presumably this 
aggravating circumstance was designed to catch fleeing 
criminals, not someone running away from home. 
And if the aggravating factors are weak, boiling 
down to the killing of a police officer, the mitigating factor 
of youth is strong. To say the least, Eddings was an immature 
and emotionally disturbed teenager. The crime and its 
background verily proclaim the youthfulness of the offender. 
Even so, and despite the strength of Eddings' 
argument that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating, 
I think it would be difficult for the Court to find the 
sentence to be "grossly disproportionate" in this case without 
adopting a per se rule, or strong presumption, against the 
~ 
capital punishment of a juvenile. Eddings killed a policeman  
without any provocation. To find the death penalty "gross ~,Y ~ 1-6 
disproportionate" in this case, when the Court has found th~ 
~- .  
death penalty to be a proper sanction in the case of first ~
degree murder, would be the equivalent of establishing a per 
se rule against the capital punishment of juveniles. But as I 
have suggested above, I do not think that contemporary 
standards in this country forbid the capital punishment of 
juveniles. Moreover, to find the sentence disproportionate in 
this case, because in this case the mitigating factors 
outweigh the aggravating, would involve the Court in policing 
particular impositions of the death penalty in a way that it 
has sought to avoid. 
On the other hand, I think Eddings has a very strong 
argument that when the lower courts refused to consider his 
unhappy family circumstances and his emotional instability 
they violated decisions of this Court in Bell v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 637 (1978) ~ Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 u.s. 633 (1977) ~ 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 u.s. 586 (1978) ~ and woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In all of these cases, the 
Court insists that the sentencing judge must consider "any 
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the 
cricumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." 438 U.S. at 604. Here 
the courts appeared to confuse excuses that absolve one of any 
criminal liability with excuses that merely soften the 
sentence. Thus the trial held that he could not "consider the 
fact of this young man's violent background." The appellate 
court reiterated this judgment: 
The petitioner also argues his mental state at 
the time of the murder. He stresses his family 
history in saying he was suffering from severe 
psychological and emotional disorders, and that the 
killing was in actuality an inevitable product of 
the way he was raised. There is no doubt that the 
petitioner has a personality disorder. But all the 
evidence tends to show that he knew the difference 
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the 
trigger, and that is the test of criminal 
responsibility in this State. For the same 
reason the petitioner's family history is useful in 
explaining why he behaved the way he did, but it 
does not excuse his behavior. 
..:;o. 
As we have discussed, the factors of a broken home, of a 
violent father, and of emotional disturbance may not add up 
to much in the case of a middle aged criminal. But when the 
offender is 16--and immature for his years at that--these 
mitigating factors are important. In a sense, by ignoring 
such factors as these the courts below did not really consider 
youth to be a mitigating factor. The courts considered age, 
but not the condition of being young. 
The one problem with this basis for decision is that 
Eddings makes the argument now for the first time. But given ~ ..... --
that this is a capital case, I believe that resort to the ~ t/?.c, 
plain error rule would be justified. Thus, without reaching ~~ 
- -----
the question of disproportionality, or the question of a per ~ 
se rule, the Court may remand for resentencing in light of 
Lockett. On remand the courts below should consider all 
mitigating circumstances. The Court may have reason to hope 
that on a remand the courts below will not see fit to set the 
same penalty--the aggravating circumstances are weak, and the 
sentence may well come out differently on a second look. Of 
course if Eddings is re-sentences to death the Court may then 
have to consider whether to impose a per se rule or find the 
punishment disproportional on the facts of the case. 
27. 
III. Conclusion 
1. Although the question is not free from doubt, 
contemporary standards in this country do not condemn the 
execution of juveniles convicted of first degree murder. 
2. The punishment of death in a case in which the 
juvenile offender has murdered a police officer is not 
"grossly disproportional." 
3. Because the courts below would not consider all 
of the mitigating factors proferred by Eddings--factors that 
are particularly important when the offender is a juvenile--
the sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for re-
sentencing in light of Lockett. 
lfp/ss 11/24/81 Rider A, p. 6 {Eddings) 
EDD6 SALLY-POW 
Under our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 
u.s. {1979), the firing of a single shot - especially 
as a spontaneous reaction to the possibility of arrest -
would not be viewed as a "heinous, atrocious and cruel" 
murder sufficiently different from any murder to qualfy as 
an "aggravating" circumstance. But the holdings of the 
courts below as to the aggravating circumstances have not 
been challenged by Eddings. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was ·Convicted of first de-
gree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence 
was imposed without "the type of individualized consider-
ation of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we 
reverse. 
I 
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several 
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes. 
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove 
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction 
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in 
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his fa-
ther. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was 
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma 
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer ap-
proached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the 
window and fired, killing the Officer. 
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have 
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there 
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was 
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the 
/ 
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on 
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then 
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District 
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo 
contendere. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in 
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . . . 
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be pre-
sented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any 
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this 
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (emphasis added). 
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circum-
stances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any 
mitigating circumstances." 
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the 
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that 
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, § 701.12 (4), (5), and (7). 
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at 
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his 
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been 
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced 
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his 
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is 
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and 
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings 
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent 
him to live with his father. But neither could the father con-
trol the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to phys-
ical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings 
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and 
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the 
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was ac-
tual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or 
something like this." 1 App. 121. 
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings 
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the 
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were 
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and 
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a socio-
pathic or anti-social personality and that 30% of youths suf-
fering from such a disorder grew out of it as they aged. 
App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile of-
fenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 149. A 
psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by 
intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 181. 
He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, he did 
kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was 
doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated, 
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society. 
App. 180-181. 
1 There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said 
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App. 
121. 
2 The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings 
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been 
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The 
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of 
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year 
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he 
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it." 
App. 172. 
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge 
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. He found that the State had proved each of the 
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circum-
stances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigat-
ing factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consid-
eration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular 
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I 
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he 
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of 
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance: 
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact 
that the youth was 16 years old when this heinous crime was 
committed. Nor can the Court infollowing the law, in my 
opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent back-
ground." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that the 
only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and finding 
further that this circumstance could not outweigh the ag-
gravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced 
Eddings to death. 
3 The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain . . . in utter indif-
ference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the 
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence 
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not 
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's 
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, there was evidence that at 
one point on the day of the murder after Eddings had been taken to the 
county jail he told to two officer that "if he was loose that he would shoot" 
them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another time, when 
an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings became 
angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and 
I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based on these 
two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a strong like-
lihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of violence if 
released. 
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The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of 
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances 
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the miti-
gating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in 
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of 
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating 
circumstance: 
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the 
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was 
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disor-
ders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable 
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt 
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all 
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference 
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trig-
ger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this 
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's 
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the 
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at 
1170. 
II 
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we 
apply today: 5 
' We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder 
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious, 
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's under-
standing and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to 
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U. S. 420 (1980). Seen. 3, supra. 
"Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 
586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contempo-
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." ld., at 604 (em-
phasis in original). 
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority 
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plu-
rality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independ-
ent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character 
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in 
mitigation .... " I d., at 605. Because the Ohio death pen-
alty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating 
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is 
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's ef-
fort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consis-
tent and principled but also humane and sensible to the 
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the 
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate 
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by 
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a 
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions, 
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit 
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders 
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to 
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences 
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into dif-
ferent degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a 
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen-
alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of 
rary standards-the eighth amendment forbids the execution of a defend-
ant who was 16 at the time of the offense. 
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our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the 
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the 
imposition of capital punishment frequently become arbitrary 
and capricious. 
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to pro-
vide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would 
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fair-
ness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary 
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is 
given adequate information and guidance." I d., at 195. By 
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its di-
rection to the jury to consider "any mitigating circum-
stances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed 
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular 
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who commit-
ted the crime .... " /d., at 197.6 
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing 
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary 
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had 
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could 
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the 
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for hu-
manity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting 
6 "[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person 
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this de-
fendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth, 
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time 
of the crime)." 428 U.S., at 197. 
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the penalty of death." I d., at 304.7 See Roberts (Harry) v. 
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. 
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976). 
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier deci-
sions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital 
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consis-
tency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be per-
mitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who com-
mitted the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. 8., at 197, the 
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice ... requires . . . that 
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the offender." 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding 
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett rec-
ognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual 
differences i~ a false consistency. 
III 
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of 
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law," 
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." There is no dispute that by "violent back-
ground" the trial judge was referring to the mitigating evi-
dence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this statement it is 
7 "A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons 
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings . 
. . . " 428 U. S., at 304. 
8 Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the 
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a 
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance. . .. 
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clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the evidence in 
mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, rather he 
found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider 
the evidenc·e. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach. 
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant be-
cause it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal 
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a 
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the 
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong 
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Simi-
larly, the evidence of Eddings' family history was "useful in 
explaining'' his behavior, but it did not "excuse" the behav-
ior. From these statements it appears that the Court of 
Criminal Appeals also considered only that evidence to be 
mitigating which would tend to support a legal excuse from 
criminal liability. 
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon 
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule 
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude 
the violent background, which I assume he meant was ... [that Eddings] 
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (ar-
gument of respondent). 
9 Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of the 
death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of the 
mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in 
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of 
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court ex-
amined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that 
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circum-
stances that ought to be weighed in the balance. Thus, the court's holding 
that these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also 
a holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in im-
posing capital pUnishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition 
for certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the 
facts of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refus-
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither 
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law, 
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as 
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the miti-
gating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The 
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may 
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evi-
dence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such 
evidence from their consideration. 10 
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was 
relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16 
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult fam-
ily history and of emotional disturbance is typically intro-
duced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some 
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight. 
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the 
ing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the 
sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett 
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with 
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not de-
pend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. 
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928). 
Moreover, Eddings specifically raised the argument upon Lockett in his 
state petition for rehearing. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Support-
ing Brief, Proposition III, at 10. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied 
the petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been 
"fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules of the Court of 
Criminal Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon a petition for 
rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). See also Wood v. 
Georgia,-- U.S.--,-- n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 631 n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478, 479 n. 3 
(1974). 
10 We note that the Oklahoma death penalty sttute permits the defendant 
to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat., Tit. 
21, § 701.10. We require the sentencer to listen. 
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offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent 
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe 
emotional disturbance is of the utmost relevance and 
importance. 
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a 
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chrono-
logical fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial rec-
ognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, gener-
ally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particu-
larly, "during the formative years of childhood and 
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
u. s. 622, 635 (1979). 
Even the normal 16-year old customarily lacks the matu-
rity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16-
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and pater-
11 "Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous 
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile De-
linquency and Youth Crime, 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the 
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less 
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as 
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve 
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control 
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, 
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the 
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, 
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth." 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young 
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime, 7 (1978). 
12 As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in 
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special 
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juve-
nile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967). 
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nal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, he was 
a juvenile with severe emotional problems, and had been 
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family back-
ground. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings' 
mental and emotional development were at a level several 
years below his chronological age. All of this does not sug-
gest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, de-
liberately committed in this case. 13 Rather, it is to say that 
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant 
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background 
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defend-
ant be given the closest attention in sentencing. 
On remand, the state courts must consider this evidence 
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circum-
stances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. We re-
quire only that they consider all of the relevant evidence 
proffered by Eddings in mitigation. 
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it 
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
13 We are not utlaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly 
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility. We are 
concerned here with the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sen-
tence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth 
with a disturbed child's immaturity. 
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Draft: No. 80-5727, Eddings v. Oklahoma 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court. 
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of 
first degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this 
sentence was imposed without "the type of individualized 
consideration of mitigating factors required by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," 
2. 
I 
On April 4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, 
and several younger companions ran away from their 
Missouri homes. They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' 
brother, and drove without destination or purpose in a 
southwesterly direction eventually reaching the Oklahoma 
turnpike. Eddings had in the car a shotgun and several 
rifles he had taken from his father. After he momentarily 
lost control of the car, he was signalled to pull over by 
Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. Eddings 
did so, and when the Officer approached the car, Eddings 
stuck a loaded shotgun out of the window and fired, 
killing the Officer. 
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved 
to have him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding 
that there was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that 
Eddings was not amenable to rehabilitation within the 
iuvenile svstem. the trial court aranted the motion. The 
3. 
(1978). Eddings was then charged with murder in the first 
degree, and the District Court of Creek County found him 
guilty upon his plea of nolo contendere. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in 
pertinent part: 
"Upon conviction .•• of guilt of a defendant of 
murder in the first degree, the court shall 
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to 
determine whether the defendant should be 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment ••.• In 
the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be 
presented as to any mitigating circumstances or 
as to any of the aggravating circumstances 
enumerated in this act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 
701.10 (emphasis added). 
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating 
circumstances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant 
by "any mitigating circumstances." 
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged 
three of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the 
statute: that the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel, that the crime was committed for the 
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, and 
that there was a orobabili tv that the defendant would 
4. 
701.12 (4), (5), and (7). 
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial 
evidence at the hearing of his troubled youth. The 
testimony of his supervising Juvenile Officer indicated 
that Eddings had been raised without proper guidance. His 
parents were divorced when he was five, and until he was 
fourteen Eddings lived with his mother without rules or 
supervision. App. 109. There is the suggestion that 
Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and possibly a 
prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings was 
fourteen he no longer could be controlled, and his mother 
sent him to live with his father. But neither could the 
father control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave 
way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer 
testified that Eddings was frightened and bitter, that his 
father overreacted and used excessive physical punishment: 
"Mr. Eddings found the only thing that he thought was 
effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical 
violence--hittinq with a strap or somethinq like this." 1 
5. 
App. 121. 
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that 
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Eddings was r~1T -v-1 [emotionallyj disturbed~ ·n general and 
at the time of the crime, and that his mental and 
emotional development were at a level several years below 
his age. App. 134, 149, and 173. A state psychologist 
stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or anti-social 
personality and that 30% of youths suffering from such a 
disorder grew out of it as they aged. App. 137 and 139. 
A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified 
that Eddings was treatable. App. 149. A psychiatrist 
testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by intensive 
therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 181. He 
testified further that Eddings 
d ' 
II . . . h was d1sassoc1at1ng at t e 
? 
I 
time of the murder, and that "he did pull the trigger, he 
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he 
was doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if 
than go back to where I live." App. 121. 
6. 
treated, Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to 
society. App. 180-181. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial 
judge weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. He found that the State had proved each of 
the three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating 
circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a 
mitigating factor of great weight: "I have given very 
serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when 
development, he acted as a seven year old seeking revenge 
and rebellion; and the act--he did pull the trigger, he 
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he 
was doing it." App. 172. 
3The trial judge found first that the crime was 
"heinous, atrocious, and cruel" because "designed to 
inflict a high degree of pain •.. in utter indifference to 
the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the 
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose 
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." 
App. 187-188. The evidence was sufficient to indicate 
that at the time of the offense Eddings did not wish to be 
returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the 
Officer's intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, 
there was evidence that at one point on the day of the 
murder after Eddings had been taken to the county jail he 
told to two officer that "if he was loose that he would 
shoot" them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at 
another time, when an Officer refused to turn off the 
light in Eddings' cell, Eddings became angry and 
threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you 
people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light 
7. 
this particular crime was commmitted. Should I fail to do 
this, I think I would not be carrying out my duty." App. 
188-189. But he would not consider in mitigation the 
circumstances of Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional 
disturbance: " ••• the Court cannot be persuaded entirely 
by the ••• fact that the youth was sixteen years old when 
this heinous crime was committed. Nor can the Court in 
following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact of 
this young man's violent background." App. 189 (emphasis 
added). Finding that the only mitigating circumstance was 
Eddings' youth and finding further that this circumstance 
could not outweigh the aggravating circumstances present, 
the judge sentenced Eddings to death. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 
sentence of death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1980). It found that each of the 
aggravating circumstances alleged by the State had been 
4 
present. \{ It recited the mitigating evidence presented by 
Eddinqs in some detail. but in the end it aqreed with the 
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the 
time of the murder. He stresses his family 
history in saying he was suffering from severe 
psychological and emotional disorders, and that 
the killing was in actuality an inevitable 
product of the way he was raised. There is no 
doubt that the petitioner has a personality 
disorder. But all the evidence tends to show 
that he knew the difference between right and 
wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and 
that is the test of criminal responsibility in 
this State. [citation] For the same reason, the 
petitioner's family history is useful in 
explaining why he behaved the way he did, but it 
does not excuse his behavior." Id., at 1170. 
II 
8. 
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 u.s. 586 (1978), CHIEF 
JUSTICE BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule 
w~we apply today:A( ~ 
"[W] e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that the sentencer ••• not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or 
record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 
(emphasis in original). --
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public 
authority is profoundly different from all other 
penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be 
free to give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of 
the defendant's character and record and to circumstances 
9. 
of the offense proffered in mitigation " Id., at 605. 
Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted 
consideration of three mitigating circumstances, the Court 
found the statute to be invalid. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is 
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's 
effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once 
consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to 
the uniqueness of the individual. s 4 nce the early days 
of the common law, the legal system has struggled to 
accommodate these twin objectives. Thus, the common law 
began by treating all criminal homicides as capital 
offenses, with a mandatory sentence of death. Later it 
allowed exceptions, first through an exclusion for those 
entitled to claim benefit of clergy and then by limiting 
capital punishment to murders upon "malice prepensed." 
In this country we attempted to soften the rigor of the 
system of mandatory death sentences we inherited from 
England, first by grading murder into different degrees of 
10. 
f..1.u_ 
the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time ofA~ 
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the 
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the 
imposition of capital punishment frequently become 
arbitrary and capricious. 
Beg inning with ~~::t '"ioc i.R Furman, the Court 
has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional 
death penalty that would serve both goals of measured, 
consistent application and fairness to the accused. Thus, 
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153 (1976), the plurality 
held that the danger of an arbitary and capricious death 
penalty could be met "by a carefully drafted statute that 
ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate 
information and guidance." Id. , at 195. By its 
requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating 
circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by 
its direction to the jury to consider "any mitigating 
circumstances," the Georgia statute properly confined and 
directed the iurv's attention to the circumstances of the 
11. 
Similarly, in woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
u.s. 280 (1976), the plurality held that mandatory death 
sentencing was not a permissible response to the problem 
of arbitrary jury discretion. As the history of capital 
punishment had shown, such an approach to the problem of 
discretion could not succeed while the Eighth Amendment 
required that the individual be given his due: "the 
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment ..• requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of 
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable 
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. " 
t 
Id., at 304.' See Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 u.s. 
633 (1977) ; Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 u.s. 
( #)5 .. [T] he jury's attention is directed to the 
characteristics of the person who committed the crime: 
••• Are there any special facts about this defendant that 
mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his 
youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, his 
emotional state at the time of the crime)." 428 u.s., at 
197. 
"1- 6 "A process that accords no significance to 
relevant facets of the character and record of the 
individual offender or the circumstances of the particular 
11. 
Similarly, in woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 {1976}, the plurality held that mandatory death 
sentencing was not a permissible response to the problem 
of arbitrary jury discretion. As the history of capital 
punishment had shown, such an approach to the problem of 
discretion could not succeed while the Eighth Amendment 
required that the individual be given his due: "the 
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of 
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable 
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. " 
) 
Id., at 304.' See Roberts {Harry} v. Louisiana, 431 u.s. 
633 {1977}; Roberts {Stanislaus} v. Louisiana, 428 u.s. 
( /)S" [T] he jury's attention is directed to the 
character is tics of the person who committed the crime: 
•.. Are there any special facts about this defendant that 
mitigate against imposing capital punishment {e.g., his 
youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, his 
emotional state at the time of the crime}." 428 u.s., at 
197. 
1 6 "A process that accords no significance to 
relevant facets of the character and record of the 
individual offender or the circumstances of the Particular 
12. 
325 (1976}. 
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the 
earlier decisions of the Court and from the Court's 
insistence that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and 
with reasonable consistency, or not at all. By requiring 
that the sentencer be permitted to focus "on the 
character is tics of the person who committed the crime," 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s., at 197, the rule in Lockett 
recognizes that "justice . . . requires • • . that there be 
taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the 
offender." Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937}. 
By holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be 
permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the 
rule in Lockett recognize~ that a consistency produced by 
ignoring individual differences is a false consistency. 
III 
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the 
/ 
13. 
that by "violent background" the trial judge was referring 
<( 
to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history/ 
From this statement it is clear that the trial judge did 
not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it 
wanting as a matter of fact, rather he found that as a 
matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same 
approach. It found that the evidence in mitigation was 
not relevant because it did not tend to provide a legal 
excuse from criminal responsibility. Thus the court 
II \\ 
conceded that Eddings had a personality disorder, but cast 
~ ~ 
this evidence aside on the basis that "he knew the 
difference between right and wrong • • • and that is the 
test of criminal responsibility." Similarly, the evidence 
of Eddings' family history was "useful in explaining" his 
behavior, but it did not "excuse" the behavior. From 
d / Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can 
~ be drawn is that the court did not consider petitioner's 
juvenile record and family life to be a mitigating 
circumstance"): Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did 
not consider the fact of his familv backoround as a 
14. 
these statements it appears that the Court of Criminal 
Appeals also considered only that evidence to be 
mitigating which would tend to support a legal excuse from 
criminal liability. 
We find that the limitations placed by these 
courts upon the mitigating evidence they would consider 
1 
rule in Lockett.i Just violated the as the state may not 
)'Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals 
that imposition of the death penalty in the particular 
circumstances of his case, and in light of the mitigating 
factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the 
trial judge erred in refusing to consider relevant 
mitigating circumstances in the process of sentencing. In 
rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court 
examined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and 
held that Eddings' family history and emotional disorder 
were not mitigating circumstances that ought to be weighed 
in the-balance. (}f ne.c.es&.i..tl'.,," the court's holding that 
these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into 
excessiveness was also a holding that he-se- ~£-S,[neea 
not have been considered by the sentencer in imposing 
capital punishment . riJ1 . -t:.bQ H-r~-t ~ce. Similarly, 
Eddings' argument in his petition for certiorari that 
imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the facts 
of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer 
erred in refusing to consider relevant mitigating 
circumstances proffered by him at the sentencing hearing. 
In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our 
decision in Lockett by name, the question of whether the 
decisions below were consistent with our decision in 
Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not 
depend on citation to book and verse. See, e.g., New York 
ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 60, 67 (1928). 
Moreover, Eddings specifically raised the 
argument upon Lockett in his state petition for 
rehearing. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting 
Brief, Proposition III. at 10. The Court of Criminal 
15. 
by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any 
mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer, refuse to 
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating 
evidence. In this instance, it was as if the trial judge 
had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence 
Eddings proffered on his behalf. The sentencer, and the 
Court of Criminal 
cU..~ ft.-L.~if~~~ 
Appeals on review, may)\ find that 
relevant mitigating evidence .. is entitled to little wei~h2J-
But they may not give it no weight by excluding such 
(~ 
evidence from their consideration , hr t~ fi~•t plaee. 
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings 
offered was relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a 
youth of 16 years at the time of the murder. Evidence of 
a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is 
typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. See 
McGautha v. California, 402 u.s. 
1--~~ , 
(1971). ~~rhap~ typically, such 
183, 187-188 and 193 
~,.. ... ...,k 
ev idence.J\ 1 given 1 it tle 




time of the offense there can be ~ieele doubt that 
IJ 
evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a 
~ 
harsh father, and of 1\ emotional disturbance is of the 
utmost relevance and importance. 
The trial judge recognized that youth must be 
considered a relevant mitigating factor. But youth is 
more than a chronological fact. It is a time and 
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to ,, 
influence and to psychological damage. /J' Our history is 
replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, 
especially in their earlier years, generally are less 
mature and responsible than adults.~ ~Particularly, 
, .. Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of 
life, are often dangerous to themselves and to others. 11 
The President 1 s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Crime, 41 (1967). .. [A]dolescents, 
particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more 
vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than 
adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful 
to victims as those committed by older persons, but they 
deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less 
capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-
range terms than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is 
not exclusively the offender 1 s fault; offenses by the 
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the 
social system, which share responsibility for the 
development of America 1 s youth. 11 Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force on Sentencinq Policv Toward Younq Offenders. 
17. 
"during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622, 635 (1979}. 
Even the normal 16-year old customarily lacks 
the maturity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a 
normal 16-year old: he had been deprived of the care, 
concern and palten~l attention that children deserve. On 
the contrary, he was a juvenile with severe emotional 
problems, and had been raised in a neglectful, sometimes 
even violent, family background. In addition, there was 
testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional development 
were at a level several years below his chronological age. 
All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility 
for the 
tf 
crime of murder, deliberately committed in this 
case P Rather, it is to say that just as the 
place. Every state in the country makes 
provision for juvenile offenders. See In 
u.s. 1, 14 (1967}. 
some separate 
re Gault, 387 
f "J A we are not unaware of the extent to which minors 
18. 
chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant 
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background 
and mental and emotional development of a youthful 
defendant be given the closest attention in sentencing. 
On remand, the the state courts must consider 
this evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the 
aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence 
for them. We require only that they consider all of the 
relevant evidence proffered by Eddings in mitigation. 
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the 
extent that it sustains the imposition of the death 
penalty, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first de-
gree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence 
was imposed without "the type of individualized consider-
ation of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we 
reverse. 
I 
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several 
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes. 
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove 
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction 
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in 
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his fa-
ther. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was 
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma 
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer ap-
proached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the 
window and fired, killing the Officer. 
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have 
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there 
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was 
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the 
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on 
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then 
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District 
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo 
contendere. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"Upon conviction ... of guilt of a defendant of murder in 
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . .. 
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be pre-
sented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any 
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this 
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (emphasis added). 
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circum-
stances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any 
mitigating circumstances." 
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the 
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that 
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, § 701.12 (4), (5), and (7). 
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at 
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his 
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been 
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced 
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his 
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is 
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and 
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings 
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent 
him to live with his father. But neither could the father con-
trol the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to phys-
ical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings 
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and 
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the 
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was ac-
tual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or 
something like this." 1 App. 121. 
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings 
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the 
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were 
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and 
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a socio-
pathic or anti-social personality and that 30% of youths suf-
fering from such a disorder grew out of it as they aged. 
App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile of-
fenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 149. A 
psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by 
intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 181. 
He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, he did 
kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was 
doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated, 
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society. 
App. 180-181. 
1 There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said 
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App. 
121. 
2 The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings 
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been 
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The 
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of 
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year 
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he 
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it. " 
App. 172. 
80--5727-0PINION 
4 EDDINGS v. OKLAHOMA 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge 
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. He found that the State had proved each of the 
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circum-
stances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigat-
ing factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consid-
eration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular 
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I 
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he 
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of 
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance: 
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact 
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime 
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in 
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that 
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and 
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced 
3 The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain ... in utter indif-
ference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the 
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence 
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not 
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's 
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, there was evidence that at 
one point on the day of the murder after Eddings had been taken to the 
county jail he told to two officer that "if he was loose that he would shoot" 
them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another time, when 
an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings became 
angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and 
I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based on these 
two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a strong like-




Eddings to death. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of 
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances 
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the miti-
gating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in 
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of 
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating 
circumstance: 
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the 
murder. He stresses his family history in saying lie was 
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disor-
ders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable 
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt 
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all 
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference 
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trig-
ger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this 
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's 
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the 
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at 
1170. 
II 
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we ap-
ply today: 5 
'We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder 
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious, 
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's under-
standing and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to 
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U. S. 420 (1980). See n. 3, supra. 
' Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contempo-
6 
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (em-
phasis in original). 
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority 
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plu-
rality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independ-
ent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character 
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in 
mitigation .... " I d., at 605. Because the Ohio death pen-
alty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating 
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is 
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's ef-
fort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consis-
tent and principled but also humane and sensible to the 
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the 
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate 
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by 
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a 
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions, 
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit 
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders 
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to 
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences 
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into dif-
ferent degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a 
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen-
alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of 
rary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defend-
ant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637 
(1978). 
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our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the 
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the 
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbi-
trary and capricious. 
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to pro-
vide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would 
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fair-
ness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary 
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is 
given adequate information and guidance." I d., at 195. By 
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its di-
rection to the jury to consider "any mitigating circum-
stances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed 
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular 
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who commit-
ted the crime .... " Id., at 197.6 
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing 
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary 
jury discretion. As the history of Cqpital punishment had 
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could 
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the 
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for hu-
manity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting 
6 "[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person 
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this de-
fendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g. , his youth, 
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time 
of the crime)." 428 U. S., at 197. 
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the penalty of death." I d., at 304.7 See Roberts (Harry) v. 
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. 
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976). 
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier deci-
sions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital 
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consis-
tency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be per-
mitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who com-
mitted the crime," Ckegg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 197, the 
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that 
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the offender." 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding 
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett rec-
ognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual 
differences is a false consistency. 
III 
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of 
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law," 
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." ·App. 189. There is no dispute that by "vio-
lent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigat-
ing evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state-
7 "A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons 
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings . 
. . . " 428 U. S., at 304. 
8 Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the 
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a 
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance .. .. 
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the 
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, 
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to 
consider the evidence. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach. 
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant be-
cause it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal 
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a 
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the 
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong 
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings 
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings' 
family history was "useful in explaining'' his behavior, but it 
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it ap-
pears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only 
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a 
legal excuse from criminal liability. 
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon 
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule 
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude 
the violent background, which I assume he meant was . . . [that Eddings] 
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (ar-
gument of respondent). 
9 Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of 
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of 
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in 
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of 
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court ex-
amined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that 
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circum-
stances that ought to be weighed in the balance. Thus, the court's holding 
that these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also 
a holding that t)1ey need not have been considered by the sentencer in im-
posing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition 
for certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the 
facts of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refus-
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the sentencer from considering ariy mitigating factor, neither 
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law, 
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as 
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the miti-
gating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The 
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may 
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evi-
dence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such 
evidence from their consideration. 10 
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was 
relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16 
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult fam-
ily history and of emotional disturbance is typically intro-
duced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some 
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight. 
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the 
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent 
ing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the 
sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett 
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with 
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not de-
pend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g. , New York ex rel. Bryant v. 
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928). 
Moreover, Eddings specifically raised the argument upon Lockett in his 
state petition for rehearing. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting 
Brief, Proposition III , at 10. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the 
petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been "fully 
advised in the premises. " See Rule 1.18, Rules of the Court of Criminal 
Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon a petition for rehear-
ing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). See also Wood v. Geor-
gia,- U. S. -,-n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 631 
n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire , 414 U. S. 478, 479 n. 3 (1974). 
10 We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defend-
ant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, § 701.10. We require the sentencer to listen. 
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family 'history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe 
emotional disturbance is of the utmost relevance and 
importance. 
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a 
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chrono-
logical fact. It is a time- and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial rec-
ognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, gener-
ally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particu-
larly "during the formative years of childhood and 
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
u. s. 622, 635 (1979). 
Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the matu-
rity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16 
year~old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and pater-
nal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, he was 
11 "Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous 
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile De-
linquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). · "[A]dolescents, particularly in the 
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less 
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as 
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve 
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control 
their conduct and. to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, 
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the 
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, 
which share responsibility for the development of Apterica's youth." 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young 
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978). 
12 As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in 
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special 
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juve-
nile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967). 
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a juvenile with ·severe emotional problems, and had been 
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family back-
ground. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings' 
mental and emotional development were at a level several 
years below his chronological age. All of this does not sug-
gest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, de-
liberately committed in this case. 13 Rather, it is to say that 
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant 
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background 
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defend-
ant be given the closest attention in sentencing. 
On remand, the state courts must consider this evidence 
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circum-
stances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. We re-
quire only that they consider all of the relevant evidence 
proffered by Eddings in mitigation. 
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it 
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is 




3 We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly 
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility. We are 
concerned here with the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sen-
tence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth 
with a disturbed child's immaturity. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80--5727 
MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA 
[November -, 1981] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first de-
gree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence 
was imposed without "the type of individualized consider-
ation of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we 
reverse. 
I 
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several 
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes. 
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove 
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction 
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in 
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his fa-
ther. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was 
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma 
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer ap-
proached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the 
window and fired, killing the Officer. 
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have 
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there 
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was 
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the 
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on 
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then 
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District 
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo 
contendere. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in 
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . .. 
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be pre-
sented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any 
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this 
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (emphasis added). 
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circum-
stances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any 
mitigating circumstances." 
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the 
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that 
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, §701.12(4), (5), and (7). 
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at 
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his 
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been 
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced 
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his 
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is 
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and 
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings 
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent 
him to live with his father. But neither could the father con-
trol the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to phys-
ical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings 
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and 
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the 
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was ac-
tual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or 
something like this." 1 App. 121. 
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings 
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the 
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were 
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and 
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a socio-
pathic or anti-social personality and that 30% of youths suf-
fering from such a disorder grew out of it as they aged. 
App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile of-
fenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 149. A 
psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by 
intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 181. 
He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, he did 
kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was 
doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated, 
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society. 
App. 180--181. 
1 There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said 
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App. 
121. 
2 The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings 
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been 
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The 
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of 
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year 
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he 




At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge 
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. He found that the State had proved each of the 
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circum-
stances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigat-
ing factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consid-
eration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular 
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I 
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he 
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of 
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance: 
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact 
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime 
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in 
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that 
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and 
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced 
3 The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain ... in utter indif-
ference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the 
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence 
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not 
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's 
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, there was evidence that at 
one point on the day of the murder after Eddings had been taken to the 
county jail he told to two officer that "if he was loose that he would shoot" 
them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another time, when 
an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings became 
angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and 
I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based on these 
two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a strong like-




Eddings to death. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of 
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances 
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the miti-
gating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in 
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of 
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating 
circumstance: 
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the 
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was 
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disor-
ders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable 
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt 
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all 
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference 
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trig-
ger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this 
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's 
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the 
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at 
1170. 
II 
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we ap-
ply today: 5 
'We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder 
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious, 
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's under-
standing and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to 
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U. S. 420 (1980). Seen. 3, supra. 
5 Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 




"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (em-
phasis in original). 
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority 
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plu-
rality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independ-
ent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character 
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in 
mitigation .... " ld., at 605. Because the Ohio death pen-
alty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating 
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is 
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's ef-
fort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consis-
tent and principled but also humane and sensible to the 
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the 
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate 
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by 
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a 
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions, 
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit 
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders 
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to 
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences 
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into dif-
ferent degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a 
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen-
alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of 
rary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defend-




our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the 
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the 
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbi-
trary and capricious. 
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to pro-
vide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would 
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fair-
ness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary 
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is 
given adequate information and guidance." I d., at 195. By 
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its di-
rection to the jury to consider "any mitigating circum-
stances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed 
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular 
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who commit-
ted the crime .... " Id., at 197.6 
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing 
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary 
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had 
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could 
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the 
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for hu-
manity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting 
6 "[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person 
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this de-
fendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth, 
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time 
of the crime)." 428 U. S., at 197. 
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the penalty of death." I d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v. 
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. 
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976). 
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier deci-
sions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital 
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consis-
tency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be per-
mitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who com-
mitted the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 197, the 
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that 
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the offender." 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding 
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett rec-
ognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual 
differences is a false consistency. 
III 
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of 
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law," 
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that by "vio-
lent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigat-
ing evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state-
" 'A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons 
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings . 
. . . " 428 U. S., at 304. 
8 Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the 
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a 
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance. . . . 
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the 
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, 
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to 
consider the evidence. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach. 
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant be-
cause it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal 
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a 
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the 
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong 
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings 
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings' 
family history was "useful in explaining'' his behavior, but it 
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it ap-
pears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only 
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a 
legal excuse from criminal liability. 
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon 
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule 
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude 
the violent background, which I assume he meant was .. . [that Eddings] 
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (ar-
gument of respondent). 
9 Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of 
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of 
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in 
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of 
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court ex-
amined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that 
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circum-
stances that ought to be weighed in the balance. Thus, the court's holding 
that these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also 
a holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in im-
posing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition 
for certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the 
facts of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refus-
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither 
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law, 
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as 
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the miti-
gating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The 
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may 
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evi-
dence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such 
evidence from their consideration. 10 
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was 
relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16 
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult fam-
ily history and of emotional disturbance is typically intro-
duced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some 
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight. 
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the 
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent 
ing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the 
sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett 
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with 
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not de-
pend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g., Ne:w York ex rel. Bryant v. 
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928). 
Moreover, Eddings specifically raised the argument upon Lockett in his 
state petition for rehearing. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting 
Brief, Proposition III, at 10. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the 
petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and had been "fully 
advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules of the Court of Criminal 
Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon a petition for rehear-
ing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). See also Wood v. Geor-
gia,-- U. S. --,-- n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 631 
n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478, 479 n. 3 (1974). 
10 We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defend-
ant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat., \ 
Tit. 21, § 701.10. Lockett requires the sentencer to listen. 
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family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe 
emotional disturbance is of the utmost relevance and 
importance. 
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a 
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chrono-
logical fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial rec-
ognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, gener-
ally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particu-
larly "during the formative years of childhood and 
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
u. s. 622, 635 (1979). 
Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the matu-
rity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16 
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and pater-
nal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, he was 
11 "Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous 
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile De-
linquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the 
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less 
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as 
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve 
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control 
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, 
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the 
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, 
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth." 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young 
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978). 
12 As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in 
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J. , concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special 
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juve-
nile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967). 
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a juvenile with severe emotional problems, and had been 
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family back-
ground. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings' 
mental and emotional development were at a level several 
years below his chronological age. All 9f this does not sug-
gest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, de-
liberately committed in this case. 13 Rather, it is to say that 
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant 
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background 
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defend-
ant be given the closest attention in sentencing. 
On remand, the state courts must consider this evidence 
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circum-
stances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. We re-
quire only that they consider all of the relevant evidence 
proffered by Eddings in mitigation. 
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it 
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
So ordered. 
13 We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly 
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility. We are 
concerned here with the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sen-
tence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth 
with a disturbed child's immaturity. 
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Petitioner was convicted in an Oklahoma trial court of first-degree murder 
for killing a police officer and was sentenced to death. At the time of 
the offense petitioner was 16 years old, but he was tried as an adult. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides that in a sentencing pro-
ceeding evi9ence may be presented as to "any mitigating circumstances" 
or as to any of certain enumerated aggravating circumstances. At the 
sentencing hearing, the State alleged certain of the enumerated ag-
gravating circumstances, and petitioner, in mitigation, presented sub-
stantial evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh fa-
ther, and of severe emotional disturbance. In imposing the death 
sentence, the trial judge found that the State had proved each of the al-
leged aggravating circumstances. But he refused, as a matter oflaw, to 
consider in mitigation the circumstances of petitioner's unhappy upbring-
ing and emotional disturbance, and found that the only mitigating cir-
cumstance was petitioner's youth, which circumstance was held to be in-
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 
Held: The death sentence must be vacated as it was imposed without "the 
type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors ... required by 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 606. Pp. 5-12. 
(a) "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the 
sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, 
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sen-
tence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, supra, at 604. This rule fol-
lows from the requirement that capital punishment be imposed fairly and 
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with reasonable consistency or not at all, and recognizes that a consis-
tency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency. 
Pp. 5-8. 
(b) The limitation placed by the courts below upon the mitigating evi-
dence they would consider violated the above rule. Just as the State 
may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigat-
ing factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of 
law, any relevant mitigating evidence. The sentencer and the review-
ing court may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evi-
dence but may not give it no weight by excluding it from their consider-
ation. Here, the evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional 
disturbance petitioner offered at the sentencing hearing was of utmost 
relevance and importance and should have been given the closest atten-
tion in sentencing. Pp. 8-12. 
616 P. 2d 1159, reversed in part and remanded. 
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page 8, note 8, that the psychiatrist who testified to this 
figure also testified to a lower figure of 20%. Perhaps we could 
~add the word "approximately" to our statement. Alternatively we 
could change "30%" to "20-30%." Or we can just ignore the 
Chief's jab. 
2. The Chief suggests at various places that the state 
court opinions are ambiguous. He suggests as well that a remand 
will be an exercise in futility. 
We could respond to these statements by suggesting that 
if the matter is ambiguous we think that the appropriate course 
is to remand. This is a capital case after all. Also, requiring 
that the lower courts adhere to Lockett is not an exercise in 
futility and it is odd to characterize compliance with 
constitutional requirements in this way. We do not know if the 
result will be different on a remand. But surely that is beside 
the point. 
3. The dissent notes that we state that evidence of a 
troubled youth is mitigating evidence of the utmost importance. 
The Chief suggests that we are trying to weigh the evidence for 
the lower courts. To some extent he is right, and it is a 
deliberate ambiguity in the opinion, as we have discussed. But 
the fact that this evidence is so important and that it was given 
so little analysis by the lower courts tends to support our 
position that the evidence simply was not considered. We could 
add a sentence to this effect. On the whole, I think we might do 
best to do nothing on this score. ~ 
4. Finally, the Chief suggests in the last section that he 
would "bite the bullet" and affirm. He does not discuss at all 
the serious eighth amendment question posed by the execution of 
juveniles. For this cavalier statement, I suspect the Chief will 
lose Justice Blackmun. At any rate we could say something about 
the importance of the question, and that we are puzzled by the 
dissent's "treatment" of the issue. 
I can draft language, if you like, for any of these 
changes if you think any desirable. 
I hope Justice O'Connor is still on the wagon. We 
haven't heard a peep out of her since her rather ambiguous join--
if that's what it was. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-5727 
MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA 
[January-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Gourt. 
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first de-
gree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence 
was imposed without "the type of individualized consider-
ation of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we 
reverse. 
I 
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several 
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes. 
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove 
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction 
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in 
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his fa-
ther. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was 
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma 
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer ap-
proached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the 
window and fired, killing the Officer. 
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have 
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there 
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was 
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the 
-1982 
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on 
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then 
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District 
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo 
contendere. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"Upon conviction ... of guilt of a defendant of murder in 
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . . . 
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be pre-
sented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any 
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this 
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.10 (emphasis added). 
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circum-
stances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any 
mitigating circumstances." 
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the 
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that 
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, §701.12(4), (5) , and (7). 
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at 
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his 
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been 
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced 
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his 
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is 
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and 
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings 
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent 
him to live with his father. But neither could the father con-
trol the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to phys-
ical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings 
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and 
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the 
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was ac-
tual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or 
something like this." 1 App. 121. 
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings 
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the 
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were 
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and 
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a socio-
pathic or anti-social personality and that approximately 30% 
of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they 
aged. App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juve-
nile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 
149. A psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabili-
tated by intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 
181. He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, 
he did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he 
was doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated, 
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society. 
App. 180-181. 
' There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said 
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live. " App. 
121. 
2 The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings 
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been 
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The 
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of 
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year 
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he 
did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he was doing it. " 
App. 172. 
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge 
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. He found that the State had proved each of the 
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circum-
stances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigat-
ing factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consid-
eration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular 
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I 
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188--189. But he 
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of 
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance: 
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact 
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime 
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in 
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that 
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and 
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the 
3 The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain . . . in utter indif-
ference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the 
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence 
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not 
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's 
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, the trial judge found that I 
Eddings posed a continuing threat of violence to society. There was evi-
dence that at one point on the day of the murder, after Eddings had been 
taken to the county jail, he told two officers that "if he was loose ... he 
would shoot" them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another 
time, when an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings 
became angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you peo-
ple, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based 
on these two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a 
strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of vio-
lence if released. 
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aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced 
Eddings to death. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of 
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances 
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the miti-
gating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in 
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of 
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating 
circumstance: 
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the 
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was 
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disor-
ders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable 
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt 
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all 
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference 
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trig-
ger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this 
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's 
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the 
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at 
1170. 
II 
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we ap-
ply today: 5 
• We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder 
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious, 
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's under-
standing and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to 
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U. S. 420 (1980). See n. 3, supra. 
5 Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 
6 
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (em-
phasis in original). 
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority 
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plu-
rality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independ-
ent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character 
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in 
mitigation .... " I d., at 605. Because the Ohio death pen-
alty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating 
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is 
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's ef-
fort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consis-
tent and principled but also humane and sensible to the 
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the 
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate 
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by 
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a 
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions, 
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit 
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders 
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to 
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences 
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into dif-
ferent degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a 
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen-
586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contempo-
rary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defend-




alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of 
our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the 
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the 
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbi-
trary and capricious. 
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to pro-
vide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would 
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fair-
ness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary 
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is 
given adequate information and guidance." ld., at 195. By 
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its di-
rection to the jury to consider "any mitigating circum-
stances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed 
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular 
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who commit-
ted the crime .... " Id., at 197. 6 
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing 
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary 
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had 
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could 
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the 
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for hu-
manity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
( 
6 "[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person 
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this de-
fendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e . g., his youth, 
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time 
of the crime)." 428 U. S., at 197. 
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constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting 
the penalty of death." !d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v. 
Louisiana, 431 U. 8. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. 
Louisiana, 428 U. 8. 325 (1976). 
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier deci-
sions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital 
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consis-
tency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be per-
mitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who com-
mitted the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. 8., at 197, the 
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that 
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the offender." 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. 8. 51, 55 (1937). By holding 
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett rec-
ognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual 
differences is a false consistency. 
III 
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of 
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law," 
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that by "vio-
lent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigat-
ing evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state-
7 "A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons 
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings . 
. . . " 428 U. S., at 304. 
8 Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the 
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a 
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the 
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, 
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to 
consider the evidence. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach. 
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant be-
cause it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal 
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a 
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the 
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong 
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings 
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings' 
family history was "useful in explaining" his behavior, but it 
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it ap-
pears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only 
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a 
legal excuse from criminal liability. 
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon 
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule 
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude 
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance .... 
the violent background, which I assume he meant was ... [that Eddings] 
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (ar-
gument of respondent). 
9 Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of 
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of 
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in 
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of 
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court ex-
amined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that 
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circum-
stances that ought to be weighed in the balance. The court's holding that 
these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also a 
holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in impos-
ing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition for 
certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the.facts of 
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither 
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law, 
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as 
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the miti-
gating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The 
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may 
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evi-
dence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such 
evidence from their consideration. w 
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was 
this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refusing to 
consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the sen-
tencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett 
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with 
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not de-
pend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. 
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928). 
Although Eddings' petition for certiorari did not expressly present the 
Lockett issue, his brief in this Court argued it, and the State responded to 
the argument. Brief for Petitioner 64-67; Brief for Respondent 5fr57. 
The dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, ante, at--, n. 1, states that 
the courts below were not afforded the opportunity to consider this issue. 
The fact is, however, that in his petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals 
for a rehearing, Eddings specifically presented the issue and at some con-
siderable length. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief III, 
at 10 ("This Court, by its interpretation of mitigating circumstances, has 
effectively limited the scope of mitigation and that limitation renders the 
Oklahoma death penalty statute unconstitutional"). The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals denied the petition, stating that it had given it full consider-
ation and had been "fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules 
of the Court of Criminal Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon 
a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). 
See also Wood v. Georgia,-- U.S.--,-- n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Ala-
bama, 447 U. S. 625, 631 n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 
478, 479 n. 3 (1974). 
10 We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defend-
ant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, § 701.10. Lockett requires the sentencer to listen. 
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relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16 
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult fam-
ily history and of emotional disturbance is typically intro-
duced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some 
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight. 
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the 
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent 
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe 
emotional disturbance is,f'~elevance and 
impm:tanoo. 
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a 
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chrono-
logical fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial rec-
ognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, gener-
ally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particu-
""Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous 
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile De-
linquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the 
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less 
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as 
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve 
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control 
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, 
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the 
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, 
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth." 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young 
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978). 
12 As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in 
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special 
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juve-
nile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967). 
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larly "during the formative years of childhood and adoles-
cence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 
622, 635 (1979). 
Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the matu-
rity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16 
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and pater-
nal attention that. children deserve. On the contrary,) e was 
a juvenile with ~8: 818 ' emotional problems, and had been 
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family back-
ground. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings' 
mental and emotional development were at a level several 
years below his chronological age. All of this does not sug-
gest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, de-
liberately committed in this case.-w Rather, it is to say that 
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant 
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background 
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defend-
ant be gi•TiR UHi aliiliilt attiRtiitf in sentencing. 
~-
it is not 
disputed that 
We add that no court can be 
1----------------~ 
unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly 
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibilitvl." We are 
concerned herefawith the 1 · ""' .~. ultimate penalty: the death sen-
tence imposed or the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth 
with a disturbed child's immaturity. 
1 
where crime is 
committed by a 
minor. 
anner of the 
imposition of 
the 
ff On remand, the state courts must consider ..,.u·~e::..:v:.!id::!.e::::n~c~e~--,...--------, 
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circum-
stances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. '~'i J?i 
¥it e onl) li88t they eonsiel:er all ef the 1 ele o al"it e o iaenee 
f3F9lf.81'8Q Qy i:fiifiiiRgB iM mi\iiga\iieM. 
k-Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it 
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case b 
all relevant 
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larly "during the formative years of childhood and adoles-
cence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 
622, 635 (1979). 
Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the matu-
rity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16 
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and pater-
nal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, e was 
a juvenile WI severe emotional problems, and had been 
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family back-
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mental and emotional development were at a level several 
years below his chronological age. All of this does not sug-
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[January-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first de-
gree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence 
was imposed without "the type of individualized consider-
ation of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we 
reverse. 
I 
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several 
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes. 
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove 
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction 
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in 
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his fa-
ther. After he momentarily lost control of the car, he was 
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma 
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer ap-
proached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the 
window and fired, killing the Officer. 
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have 
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there 
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was 
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the 
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on 
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then 
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District 
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo 
contendere. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in 
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . .. 
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be pre-
sented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any 
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this 
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (emphasis added). 
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circum-
stances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any 
mitigating circumstances." 
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the 
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that 
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, §701.12(4), (5), and (7). 
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at 
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his 
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been 
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced 
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his 
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is 
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and 
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings 
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent 
him to live with his father. But neither could the father con-
trol the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to phys-
ical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings 
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and 
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the 
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was ac-
tual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or 
something like this." 1 App. 121. 
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings 
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the 
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were 
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and 
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a socio-
pathic or anti-social personality and that approximately 30% l 
of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they 
aged. App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juve-
nile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 
149. A psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabili-
tated by intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 
181. He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, 
he did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he 
was doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated, 
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society. 
App. 180-181. 
1 There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said 
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App. 
121. 
2 The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings 
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been 
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The 
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of 
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year 
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he 




At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge 
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. He found that the State had proved each of the 
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circum-
stances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigat-
ing factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consid-
eration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular 
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I 
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he 
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of 
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance: 
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact 
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime 
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in 
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that 
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and 
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the 
3 The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain . . . in utter indif-
ference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." App. 187. Second, the 
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence 
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not 
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's 
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, the trial judge found that t 
Eddings posed a continuing threat of violence to society. There was evi-
dence that at one point on the day of the murder, after Eddings had been 
taken to the county jail, he told two officers that "if he was loose ... he 
would shoot" them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another 
time, when an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings 
became angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you peo-
ple, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based 
on these two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a 
strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of vio-
lence if released. 
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aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced 
Eddings to death. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of 
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances 
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the miti-
gating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in 
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of 
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating 
circumstance: 
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the 
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was 
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disor-
ders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable 
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt 
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all 
the evidence tends to show th11t he knew the difference 
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trig-
ger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this 
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's 
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the 
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." !d., at 
1170. 
II 
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we ap-
ply today: 5 
' We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder 
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious; 
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's under-
standing and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to 
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U. S. 420 (1980). Seen. 3, supra. 




"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (em-
phasis in original). 
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority 
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plu-
rality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independ-
ent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character 
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in 
mitigation .... " Id., at 605. Because the Ohio death pen-
alty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating 
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid. 
As THE CHIEF JusTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is 
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's ef-
fort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consis-
tent and principled but also humane and sensible to the 
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the 
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate 
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by 
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a 
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions, 
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit 
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders 
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to 
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences 
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into dif-
ferent degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a 
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen-
586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contempo-
rary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defend-
ant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637 
(1978). 
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alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of 
our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. 8. 238 (1972), the 
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the 
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbi-
trary and capricious. 
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to pro-
vide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would 
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fair-
ness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. 8. 
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary 
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is 
given adequate information and guidance." I d., at 195. By 
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its di-
rection to the jury to consider "any mitigating circum-
stances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed 
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular 
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who commit-
ted the crime .... " !d., at 197. 6 
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. 8. 280 
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing 
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary 
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had 
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could 
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the 
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for hu-
manity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
6 "[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person 
who committed the crime: . . . Are there any special facts about this de-
fendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth, 
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time 
of the crime). " 428 U. S., at 197. 
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constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting 
the penalty of death." I d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v. 
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. 
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976). 
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier deci-
sions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital 
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consis-
tency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be per-
mitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who com-
mitted the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 197, the 
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that 
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the offender." 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding 
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett rec-
ognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual 
differences is a false consistency. 
III 
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of 
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law," 
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that by "vio-
lent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigat-
ing evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state-
' "A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons 
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings . 
. . . " 428 U. S., at 304. 
8 Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the 
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a 
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the 
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, 
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to 
consider the evidence. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach. 
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant be-
cause it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal 
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a 
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the 
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong 
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings 
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings' 
family history was "useful in explaining" his behavior, but it 
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it ap-
pears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only 
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a 
legal excuse from criminal liability. 
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon 
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule 
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude 
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance .... 
the violent background, which I assume he meant was ... [that Eddings] 
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (ar-
gument of respondent). 
9 Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of 
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of 
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in 
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of 
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court ex-
amined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that 
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circum-
stances that ought to be weighed in the balance. The court's holding that 1 
these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also a 
holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in impos-
ing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition for 
certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the.facts of 
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither 
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law, 
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as 
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the miti-
gating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The 
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may 
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evi-
dence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such 
evidence from their consideration. w 
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was 
this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refusing to 
consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the sen-
tencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett 
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with 
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not de-
pend on citation to book and verse. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. 
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928). 
Although Eddings' petition for certiorari did not expressly present the 
Lockett issue, his brief in this Court argued it, and the State responded to 
the argument. Brief for Petitioner 64-67; Brief for Respondent 55-57. 
The dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, ante, at--, n. 1, states that 
the courts below were not afforded the opportunity to consider this issue. 
The fact is, however, that in his petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals 
for a rehearing, Eddings specifically presented the issue and at some con-
siderable length. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief III, 
at 10 ("This Court, by its interpretation of mitigating circumstances, has 
effectively limited the scope of mitigation and that limitation renders the 
Oklahoma death penalty statute unconstitutional"). The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals denied the petition, stating that it had given it full consider-
ation and had been "fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules 
of the Court of Criminal Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon 
a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). 
See also Wood v. Georgia, -- U. S. --, -- n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Ala-
bama, 447 U. S. 625, 631 n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 
478, 479 n. 3 (1974). 
10 We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defend-
ant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, § 701.10. Lockett requires the sentencer to listen. 
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relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16 
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult fam-
ily history and of emotional disturbance is typically intro-
duced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some 
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight. 
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the 
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent 
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe 
emotional disturbance is of the utmost relevance and 
importance. 
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a 
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chrono-
logical fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial rec-
ognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, gener-
ally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particu-
11 "Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous 
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile De-
linquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the 
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less 
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as 
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve 
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control 
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, 
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the 
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, 
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth." 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young 
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978). 
12 As Justice Frankfurter stated, "(c]hildren have a very special place in 
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special 
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juve-
nile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967). 
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larly "during the formative years of childhood and adoles-
cence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 
622, 635 (1979). 
Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the matu-
rity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16 
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and pater-
nal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, he was 
a juvenile with severe emotional problems, and had been 
raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family back-
ground. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings' 
mental and emotional development were at a level several 
years below his chronological age. All of this does not sug-
gest an absence of responsibility for the crime of murder, de-
liberately committed in this case. 13 Rather, it is to say that 
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant 
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background 
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defend-
ant be given the closest attention in sentencing. 
On remand, the state courts must consider this evidence 
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circum-
stances. We do not weigh the evidence for them. We re-
quire only that they consider all of the relevant evidence 
proffered by Eddings in mitigation. 
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it 
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is 
13 We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly 
in violent crime. See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Report of the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
3 (1976). Nor do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility. We are 
concerned here with the severity of the ultimate penalty: the death sen-
tence imposed for the crime of murder by an emotionally disturbed youth 
with a disturbed child's immaturity. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80--5727 
MONTY LEE EDDINGS, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA 
[January-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first de-
gree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence 
was imposed without "the type of individualized consider-
ation of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases," Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we 
reverse. 
I 
On April4, 1977, Eddings, a 16 year old youth, and several 
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes. 
They travelled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove 
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction 
eventually reaching the Oklahoma turnpike. Eddings had in 
the car a shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his fa-
ther. Mter he momentarily lost control of the car, he was 
signalled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma 
Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the Officer ap-
proached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out of the 
window and fired, killing the Officer. 
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have 
him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there 
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was 
not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the 
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trial court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on 
appeal. Matter of M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1978), cert denied, 436 U. S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then 
charged with murder in the first degree, and the District 
Court of Creek County found him guilty upon his plea of nolo 
contendere. 
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"Upon conviction ... of guilt of a defendant of murder in 
the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant 
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . .. 
In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be pre-
sented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any 
of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this 
act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.10 (emphasis added). 
Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circum-
stances; the statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any 
mitigating circumstances." 
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the 
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that 
the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest, and that there was a· probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, § 701.12 (4), (5), and (7). 
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at 
the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his 
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been 
raised without proper guidance. His parents were divorced 
when he was five, and until he was 14 Eddings lived with his 
mother without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is 
the suggestion that Eddings' mother was an alcoholic and 
possibly a prostitute. App. 110-111. By the time Eddings 
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was 14 he no longer could be controlled, and his mother sent 
him to live with his father. But neither could the father con-
trol the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave way to phys-
ical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings 
was frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and 
used excessive physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the 
only thing that he thought was effectful with the boy was ac-
tual punishment, or physical violence-hitting with a strap or 
something like this." 1 App. 121. 
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings 
was emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the 
crime, and that his mental and emotional development were 
at a level several years below his age. App. 134, 149, and 
173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a socio-
pathic or anti-social personality and that approximately 30% 
of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it as they 
aged. App. 137 and 139. A sociologist specializing in juve-
nile offenders testified that Eddings was treatable. App. 
149. A psychiatrist testified that Eddings could be rehabili-
tated by intensive therapy over a 15 to 20 year period. App. 
181. He testified further that Eddings "did pull the trigger, 
he did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he 
was doing it." 2 The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated, 
Eddings would no longer pose a serious threat to society. 
App. 180-181. 
' There was evidence that immediately after the shooting Eddings said 
"I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App. 
121. 
2 The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder, Eddings 
was in his own mind shooting his stepfather-a policeman who had been 
married to his mother for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The 
psychiatrist stated "I think that given the circumstances and the facts of 
his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a seven year 
old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act-he did pull the trigger, he 




At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge 
weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. He found that the State had proved each of the 
three alleged aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 3 Turning to the evidence of mitigating circum-
stances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigat-
ing factor of great weight: "I have given very serious consid-
eration to the youth of the Defendant when this particular 
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I 
would not be carrying out my duty." App. 188-189. But he 
would not consider in mitigation the circumstances of 
Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance: 
". . . the Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact 
that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime 
was committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in 
my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189 (emphasis added). Finding that 
the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth and 
finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the 
' The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous, atrocious, and 
cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of pain 0 0 0 in utter indif-
ference to the rights of Patrolman Crabtree." Appo 1870 Second, the 
judge found that the crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution." App. 187-188. The evidence 
was sufficient to indicate that at the time of the offense Eddings did not 
wish to be returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the Officer's 
intent was to make a lawful arrest. Finally, the trial judge found that 
Eddings posed a continuing threat of violence to society. There was evi-
dence that at one point on the day of the murder, after Eddings had been 
taken to the county jail, he told two officers that "if he was loose .. . he 
would shoot" them all. App. 77. There was also evidence that at another 
time, when an Officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings 
became angry and threatened the Officer: "Now I have shot one of you peo-
ple, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." App. 103. Based 
on these two "spontaneous utterances," app. 188, the trial judge found a 
strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a criminal act of vio-
lence if released. 
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aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced 
Eddings to death. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of 
death. Eddings v. State, 616 P. 2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances 
alleged by the State had been present. 4 It recited the miti-
gating evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but in 
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of 
Eddings' youth was properly considered as a mitigating 
circumstance: 
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the 
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was 
suffering from severe psychological and emotional disor-
ders, and that the killing was in actuality an inevitable 
product of the way he was raised. There is no doubt 
that the petitioner has a personality disorder. But all 
the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference 
between right and wrong at the time he pulled the trig-
ger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility in this 
State. [citation] For the same reason, the petitioner's 
family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the 
way he did, but it does not excuse his behavior." I d., at 
1170. 
II 
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we ap-
ply today: 5 
'We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the murder 
of a police officer in the performance of his duties is "heinous, atrocious, 
and cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 
U. S. 633, 636 (1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's under-
standing and application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to 
that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U. S. 420 (1980). See n. 3, supra. 
"Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
6 
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"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded 
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death." ld., at 604 (em-
phasis in original). 
Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority 
is ... profoundly different from all other penalties," the plu-
rality held that the sentencer must be free to give "independ-
ent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character 
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in 
mitigation .... " ld., at 605. Because the Ohio death pen-
alty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating 
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid. 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is 
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's ef-
fort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consis-
tent and principled but also humane and sensible to the 
uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the 
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate 
these twin objectives. Thus, the common law began by 
treating all criminal homicides as capital offenses, with a 
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions, 
first through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit 
of clergy and then by limiting capital punishment to murders 
upon "malice prepensed." In this country we attempted to 
soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences 
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into dif-
ferent degrees of which only murder of the first degree was a 
capital offense and then by committing use of the death pen-
586 (1978), we do not reach the question of whether-in light of contempo-
rary standards-the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defend-
ant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637 
(1978). 
80-5727-0PINION 
EDDINGS v. OKLAHOMA 7 
alty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By the time of 
our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the 
country had moved so far from a mandatory system that the 
imposition of capital punishment frequently had become arbi-
trary and capricious. 
Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to pro-
vide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would 
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fair-
ness to the accused. Thus, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153 (1976), the plurality held that the danger of an arbitary 
and capricious death penalty could be met "by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is 
given adequate information and guidance." ld., at 195. By 
its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its di-
rection to the jury to consider "any mitigating circum-
stances," the Georgia statute properly confined and directed 
the jury's attention to the circumstances of the particular 
crime and to "the characteristics of the person who commit-
ted the crime .... " ld., at 197.6 
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U. S. 280 
(1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing 
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary 
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had 
shown, such an approach to the problem of discretion could 
not succeed while the Eighth Amendment required that the 
individual be given his due: "the fundamental respect for hu-
manity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
6 "[T]he jury's attention is directed to the characteristics of the person 
who committed the crime: ... Are there any special facts about this de-
fendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e. g., his youth, 
the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time 
of the crime)." 428 U.S. , at 197. 
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constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting 
the penalty of death." I d., at 304. 7 See Roberts (Harry) v. 
Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. 
Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976). 
Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier deci-
sions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital 
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consis-
tency, or not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be per-
mitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person who com-
mitted the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 197, the 
rule in Lockett recognizes that "justice ... requires . . . that 
there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the offender." 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding 
that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett rec-
ognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual 
differences is a false consistency. 
III 
We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of 
this case. The trial judge stated that "in following the law," 
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent 
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that by "vio-
lent background" the trial judge was referring to the mitigat-
ing evidence of Eddings' family history. 8 From this state-
"''A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons 
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings . 
. . . " 428 U. S., at 304. 
8 Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the 
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be a 
mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 ("the trial court did not con-
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ment it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the 
evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, 
rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to 
consider the evidence. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach. 
It found that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant be-
cause it did not tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal 
responsibility. Thus the court conceded that Eddings had a 
"personality disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the 
basis that "he knew the difference between right and wrong 
... and that is the test of criminal responsibility." Eddings 
v. State, supra, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings' 
family history was "useful in explaining'' his behavior, but it 
did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements it ap-
pears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only 
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a 
legal exG_use from criminal liability. . 
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon 
the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule 
in Lockett. 9 Just as the state may not by statute preclude 
sider the fact of his family background as a mitigating circumstance. . .. 
the violent background, which I assume he meant was ... [that Eddings] 
was subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father.") (ar-
gument of respondent). 
9 Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition of 
the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case, and in light of 
the mitigating factors present, was excessive punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. But he did not specifically argue that the trial judge erred in 
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of 
sentencing. In rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court ex-
amined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that 
Eddings' family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circum-
stances that ought to be weighed in the balance. The court's holding that 
these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also a 
holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in impos-
ing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition for 
certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the facts of 
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the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither 
may the sentencer, refuse to consider, as a matter of law, 
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as 
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the miti-
gating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The 
sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may 
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evi-
dence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such 
evidence from their consideration. 10 
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was 
this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refusing to 
consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the sen-
tencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari spoke to our decision in Lockett 
by name, the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with 
our decision in Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not de-
pend on citation to book and· . .'!rse. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. 
Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 60, 67 (1928). 
Although Eddings' petition for certiorari did not expressly present the 
Lockett issue, his brief in this Court argued it, and the State responded to 
the argument. Brief for Petitioner 64-Q7; Brief for Respondent 55-57. 
The dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, ante, at--, n. 1, states that 
the courts below were not afforded the opportunity to consider this issue. 
The fact is, however, that in his petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals 
for a rehearing, Eddings specifically presented the issue and at some con-
siderable length. See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief III, 
at 10 ("This Court, by its interpretation of mitigating circumstances, has 
effectively limited the scope of mitigation and that limitation renders the 
Oklahoma death penalty statute unconstitutional"). The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals denied the petition, stating that it had given it full consider-
ation and had been "fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules 
of the Court of Criminal Appeals (court will entertain new arguments upon 
a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476 (1975). 
See also Wood v. Georgia,-- U. S. --, -- n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Ala-
bama, 447 U. S. 625, 631 n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 
478, 479 n. 3 (1974). 
10 We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defend-
ant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstance." Okla. Stat., 
Tit. 21, § 701.10. Lockett requires the sentencer to listen. 
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relevant mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16 
years at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult fam-
ily history and of emotional disturbance is typically intro-
duced by defendants in mitigation. See McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U. S. 183, 187-188 and 193 (1971). In some 
cases, such evidence properly may be given little weight. 
But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the 
offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent 
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe 
emotional disturbance is particularly relevant. 
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a 
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chrono-
logical fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person 
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. 11 Our history is replete with laws and judicial rec-
ognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, gener-
ally are less mature and responsible than adults. 12 Particu-
larly "during the formative years of childhood and 
11 "Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often dangerous 
to themselves and to others." The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile De-
linquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[A]dolescents, particularly in the 
early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less 
self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as 
harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve 
less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control 
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, 
youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the 
young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, 
which share responsibility for the development of America's youth." 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young 
Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978). 
12 As Justice Frankfurter stated, "(c]hildren have a very special place in 
life which law should reflect." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). And indeed the law does reflect this special 
place. Every state in the country makes some separate provision for juve-
nile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 14 (1967). 
I 
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adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
u. s. 622, 635 (1979). 
Even the normal 16 year old customarily lacks the matu-
rity of an adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal16 
year old; he had been deprived of the care, concern and pater-
nal attention that children deserve. On the contrary, it is 
not disputed that he was a juvenile with serious emotional 
problems, and had been raised in a neglectful, sometimes 
even violent, family background. In addition, there was tes-
timony that Eddings' mental and emotional development 
were at a level several years below his chronological age. 
All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for 
the crime of murder, deliberately committed in this case. 
Rather, it is to say that just as the chronological age of a mi-
nor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so 
must the background and mental and emotional development 
of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing. 
We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage 
increasingly in violent crime. 13 Nor do we suggest an ab-
sence of legal responsibility where crime is committed by a 
minor. We are concerned here only with the manner of the 
imposition of the ultimate penalty: the death sentence im-
posed for the crime of murder@" an emotlona1Iya1s urbe 
youth with a disturbed child's immaturity. 
On remand, the state courts must consider all relevant { 
mitigating evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the 
aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence 
for them. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the ex-
tent that it sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and 
13 See, e. g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Stan- I 
dards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Report of 
the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 3 (1976). 
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the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
2nd DRAFT 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. ~ ~ 
[January-, 1982] 
I write separately to address more fully the reasons why ) 
this case must be remanded in light of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U. S. 586 (1978), which requires the trial court to consider · rJ 
and weigh all of the mitigating evidence concerning the peti- CIM iS$/ 0 
tioner's family background and personal history.* 
Because sentences of death are "qualitatively different" 
from prison sentences, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.), this Court has 
gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner 
sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guaran-
tee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was 
not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake. 
*Despite THE CHIEF JUSTICE's argument that we may not consider the 
Lockett issue because it was never fairly presented to the court below, 
there is precedent for this Court to consider the merits of the issue. In 
.Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 265, n. 5 (1981), this Court wrote: 
"Even if one considers that the conflict-of-interest question was not tech-
nically raised below, there is ample support for a remand required in the 
interests of justice. See 28 U. S. C. § 2106 (authorizing this Court to 're-
quire such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circum- , 
stances')." / 0 #nl ~sro tJ Because the trial court's failure to consider all of the mitigating evidence 
risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence, in plain violation of 
Lockett, it is our duty to remand this case for resentencing. 
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Surely, no less can be required when the defendant is a 
minor. One example of the measures taken is in Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), where a plurality of this Court 
wrote: 
"There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which 
cases governmental authority should be used to impose 
death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all 
capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight 
to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to 
circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation cre-
ates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in 
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. 
When the choice is between life and death, that risk is 
unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 438 U. S., at 
605 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). 
In order to ensure that the death penalty was not errone-
ously imposed, the Lockett plurality concluded that "the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sen-
tencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be pre-
cluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of 
a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death." ld., at 604 (emphasis in 
original). 
In the present case, of course, the relevant Oklahoma stat-
ute permits the defendant to present evidence of any mitigat-
ing circumstance. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10. None-
theless, in sentencing the petitioner (which occurred about 
one month before Lockett was decided), the judge remarked 
that he could not "in following the law . . . consider the fact of 
this young man's violent background." App. 189. Although 
one can reasonably argue that these extemporaneous re-
marks are of no legal significance, I believe that the reason-
ing of the plurality opinion in Lockett compels a remand so 
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that we do not "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in 
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty." 
438 U. S., at 605. 
I disagree with the suggestion in the dissent that remand- J 
ing this case may serve no useful purpose. Even though the 
petitioner had an opportunity to present evidence in mitiga-
tion of the crime, it appears that the trial judge believed that 
he could not consider some of the mitigating evidence in im-
posing sentence. In any event, we may not speculate as to 
whether the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeals ac-
tually considered all of the mitigating factors and found them 
insufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances, or 
whether the difference between this Court's opinion and the 
trial court's treatment of the petitioner's evidence is "purely 
a matter of semantics," as suggested by the dissent. 
Woodson and Lockett require us to remove any legitimate 
basis for finding ambiguity concerning the factors actually 
considered by the trial court. 
THE CHIEF JusTICE may be correct in concluding that the 
Court's opinion reflects a decision by some Justices that they 
would not have imposed the death penalty in this case had 
they sat as the trial judge. See ante, at 10-12. I, however, 
do not read the Court's opinion either as altering this Court's 
opinions establishing the constitutionality of the death pen-
alty or as deciding the issue of whether the Constitution per-
mits imposition of the death penalty on an individual who 
committed a murder at age 16. Rather, by listing in detail 
some of the circumstances surrounding the petitioner's life, 
the Court has sought to emphasize the variety of mitigating 
information that may not have been considered by the trial 
court in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or 
some lesser sentence. 
/ 
lfp/ss 01/18/e-2 80-5727 Eddings v. Oklahoma 
EDDINGSS SALLY-POW 
This is a capital case, here on certiorari to the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. 
When Eddings was 16 years old ~he shot and killed~ 
a state highway patrol officer. At the time,/~ddings -with 
three younger juveniles - was running away from their 
Missouri homes. He had a history of emotional problems / had 
been raised in a difficult family situation~and there was 
testimony/ that his mental and emotional development;'ere at 
a level/~eve~l years below/ his chronological age. 
;"""~ 
The Oklahoma capital punishment statute provides, J 
I 
in the sentencing proceeding,/ that evidence may be presented 
as to mitigating/ and aggr~~ting circumstances. 
Eddings' ~ was considered as a mitigating 
circumstance,~but this was viewed as outweighed by 
i!ggra ating circumstances - primarily the deliberate 
shooting of a state officer;'ithout provocation other than 
the fact / that Eddings had been stopped on a state highway 
for erratic driving. 
Al ·:.......,.. mgh the trial court admit d evidence) as to 
Eddings' family history~and emot~onal instability, j it 
declined to considered these /as mitigating circumstances. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed ;land the sentence of 
death was affirmed. 
In Lockett v. Ohio we held that the Eighth and 
2. 
Fourteenth Amendments require - in a capital case - that the 
sentencing authority~~t be precluded from considering ~as a 
mitigating factor yi~Y aspe~~ of a defendant's character or 
record. 
We think the Oklahoma courts committed erro~in 
failing to consider Eddings' backgroun~in mitigation. We 
therefore reverse the judgment insofar as it imposed the 
death penalty,/ and remand the case for further proceedings. 
I~a~a.tiRhis Court is ~t ~awareJ'of the extent 
to which minors;lengage increasingly in violent crime. Nor 
do we suggest an absence of legal responsibility/ where crime 
is committed by a minor. We are concerned in thi~as~nly 
with the validity of the procedur,;by which the death 
... ~ _, / 
penalty was imposed on an emotionally disturber l6 year old. 
~ Justices Brennan and O'Connor ~ f1led concurring 
opinions. The Chief Justice has filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist join. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
,ju;rrtntt (!Jcurt ttf tlrt ~tb .;itatts 
._a\T4ingtcn, ~. OJ. 2llgt~~ 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR. January 20, 1982 
Memorandum to the Conference 
There are three cases being held for the decision 
in 80-5727, Eddings v. Oklahoma: 
Legare v. Zant----80-6725 Cert. to Georgia SC 
This case is here after the Georgia courts denied 
petitioner's effort to gain post-conviction relief. 
Petitioner argues that the jury was prevented from 
considering his youth as a mitigating factor. Petitioner 
was 17 years of age at the time of the killing. The 
prosecutor, on voir dire, asked nearly ever prospective 
juror whether the defendant's youth would have any effect on 
the juror's consideration of the death penalty. According 
to petitioner, the few prospective jurors who said that they 
would consider the defendant's youth were struck by the 
state. In closing argument, the prosecutor referred back to 
his question on voir dire and urged the jury not to consider 
the defendant's youth. He said: 
"I asked each and every one of you that 
if because of the age of the defendant in 
this case, you would be more likely to vote 
against the death penalty for him than you 
would, say, a thirty year old man ••• I asked 
each one of you and each one of you said no 
"And you'll have the satisfaction of 
knowing that you have, in a case where the 
evidence demanded, not only justified, but 
demanded the death penalty, if you 
disconsider his age, disconsider all of those 
things which you're not supposed to 
consider ••• 
"Just remember the evidence •••• Push 
the age of the defendant out of your mind. 
He may be seventeen years chronologically but 
he's older than any of us in the ways of evil 
••• "Pet. at 21. 
Furthermore, during the defense counsel's closing 
argument, the prosecutor objected to his statement to the 
jury that "if you're going to take a seventeen year old boy 
and electrocute him, now--where are you going to cut it off, 
2. 
are you going down to ten years, fourteen years, sixteen 
years ••• " Reply at 5. The prosecutor objected on the 
grounds that defense counsel was "perfectly well aware that 
there's a law that sets minimum age on this matter." In 
Georgia no one under the age of 13 may be excecuted. The 
trial judge sustained the objection, saying: 
"I think that {defense counsel's] 
argument is an incorrect principle of law. 
You have leeway to argue matters of common 
knowledge, but if you are going to argue 
them, I think it ought be correct. Ladies 
and Gentlemen, you've heard the evidence. 
It's up to you to determine what punishment 
he is to receive. Do not let any common 
denominator have any effect upon your 
responsibility." Reply at 6. 
Petitioner suggests that this instruction from the bench may 
have been understood by the jury as a direction not to 
consider the defendant's age in mitigation. 
In considering petitioner's petition for habeas 
corpus, the state superior court rejected petitioner's 
argument that the jury had not been permitted to consider 
the fact of his youth. The trial court instructed the jury 
that it could consider "all the evidence received in court" 
including "the facts and circumstances, if any, in 
extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation of punishment which 
may have been submitted to you." The court found that only 
one prospective juror indicated that she would not be able 
to impose the death penalty because of the defendant's age, 
and she was not excused for cause. Finally, although 
defense counsel made the argument, he did not introduce any 
mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial. 
For these reasons, the superior court rejected petitioner's 
contention as without merit. The Supreme Court of Georgia 
denied petitioner's application for a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal. There has been no §2254 review. 
I think that this case is sufficiently close to 
the situation in Eddings, that the Court should remand the 
matter in light of Eddin6s. There appears to be a 
substantial likelihood t at the jury as constituted believed 
that it could not consider the defendant's age or was free 
simply to ignore this factor in mitigation. I recommend 
that the Court grant, vacate, and remand for further 
consideration in light of Eddings. 
3. 
High v. Georgia----No. 80-6843 Cert to Georgia SC 
This case is here on direct appeal from the 
Georgia Supreme Court. Petitioner was 17, eleven months, 
and 10 days old at the time of the crime. Following an 
armed robbery of a service station, petr and several others 
took the owner of the station and his 11 year old son--the 
only witnesses to the robbery--to a secluded wooded area 
where they shot both of them. The father survived his 
wounds; the boy did not. On the way to the excecution 
site, petr taunted the child, telling him he was going to 
die. 
Petitioner argues that it violates the eighth 
amendment to execute a person under age 18. Unlike the 
situation in Eddings, however, it does not appear from the 
state court opinion or the papers attached to the cert 
petition that petr ever tried to place~ mitigating 
factors before the jury. The trial judge instructed the 
jury to consider any relevant mitigating evidence, and petr 
makes no argument that the lower courts denied him the 
opportunity of presenting relevant mitigating evidence 
concerning his youth or upbringing. The case does not 
appear to bear any resemblance to Eddings, and I therefore 
recommend denial. 
Roach v. South Carolina----No. 81-5628 Cert to 
South Carolina SC 
4. 
This case is here following rejection of 
petitioner's effort to gain post-conviction relief in state 
court. Petitioner participated in an extraordinarily savage 
double murder of a 17 year old boy and a 14 year old girl. 
Petitioner was 17 at the time of the murders. The trial 
judge found that there were 6 mitigating factors including 
the petitioner's "age or mentality" at the time of the 
crime. Notwithstanding these factors in mitigation, the 
judge found that the death penalty was appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case. The sentence was affirmed on 
direct appeal, and the state courts refused to disturb it in 
post-conviction proceedings. There has been no §2254 
review. 
Although petitioner was 17 at the time of the 
crime, there is no claim here that petitioner was deprived 
of the opportunity of presenting factors in mitigation for 
the sentencer's consideration as there was in Eddings. I 
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WASHINGTON, Jan. '19- The Su-
preme Court today overturned a sen-
tence of death imposed by the state 
courts in Oklahoma on a boy who was 16 
years old when he . murdered , a state 
trooper. 
The 5-to-4 ruling sidestepped the un-
derlying constitutional issue in the case: 
whether the Eighth Amendment which 
prohibits cruel and unusual punish-
ment, ever permits the execution of a 
juvenile offender. 
Instead, the Court, in a majority deci-
s ion by Associate Justice Lewis F. Ppw-
ell Jr., ruled that the Oklahoma courts 
had erred in failing to take the young of-
fender's disturbed emotional state and 
deprived family background into ac-
count as mitigating factors in the deci-
sion to impose the death penalty. That 
conclusion made it unnecessary for the 
Court to decide the broader constitu-
tional issue. As a result, the deciSion has 
no immediate effect on the 16 other 
Death Row inmates around the country-
who are under the age of 18. 
But if the legal ruling was a narrow 
one, it was potentially significant as an 
indication of the Court's current lineup 
on the capital punisluhent, issue. The . . . 
case was the first death penalty case to 
reach the Court since Sandra Day O'-
Connor replaced Potter Stewart, who 
wrote several of the Court's decisions in-
validating deatl\ sentences. Justice O'-
Connor joined the majority today and 
also wrote a separate concurring opin-
ion. I 
Dispute on Jurisdictional Issue 
The ruling sparked an unusually con-
tentious debate between the majority 
and the dissenters, led by Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger, on a jurisdictional 
issue that has ramifications for the 
Courfbeyond the case at hand. 
Lawyers for Monty Lee Eddings, the 
defendant; had mounted a broad Eighth 
Amendment attack on the application of 
the death penalty to juveniles, and ,nei-
ther in the lower courts nor in their peti-
tion to the Supreme Court did they raise 
the procedural issue that formed the 
basis for the majority's opinion. 
That lapse, Chief Justice Burger said 
in a dissenting opinion, should have pre-
vented the Court from ruling on that 
issue. The Court should have upheld the 
death sentence, the Chief Justice said. 
The dissent was joined by Associate Jus-
tices Byron R. White, Harry A. Black-
mun and William H. Rehnquist. · 
Addressing the dissent's complaint in the defense lawyers offered as r 
a footnote, Justice Powell said ,thdt the . ing evidence not only their clier 
fact that the issue had not .been explic- but his background as an abuse 
itly raised should not prevent the Court 'and psychologically disturbed 
from deciding it. "Our jurisdiction does cent: The youth was running aw~ 
not depend on citation to book , and home when he shot and killed a h 
verse," he wrote. patrolman who stopped the car 
driving. I 
Differences In Procedures The trial judge took the youtl 
Appellate courts as a rule decline to · into consideration but declined 
decide issues that parties have riot sider the other evidence, a decisi 
raised in the lower courts. But partieS was upheld by the Oklahoma C 
before the Supreme Court often try to · Criminal Appeals. 
bring such issues up, and t~e Justices do 'Not a Normal 16-Year-Old 
not seem to apply a consistent pol!cy on , "We find that the limitations 
the matter. The debate today seemed to · 
indicate that, at leaSt when capital pun- by these courts upon the mitigati 
. dence they would consider viola 
ishment lS at .stake, a narrow majority ruleofLockett," JusticePowelh 
of the Court believes it should not penal- The defendant, Justice Powe 
lze defendants for omissions In the pre- was "not a normal 16-year-old ,· 
sentation of their case. · , l . been deprived of the care, COnCE 
The majority ruling today, Eddings v. .paternal attention that childr 
Oklahoma, No. SG-5727, was based on a serve." . 
1978 Supreme Court decision, Lockett v.'- He concluded:· "All of this d4 
Ohio. The Lockett decis~on held that in suggest an absence of responsibi 
deciding whether to impoee a death sen- the crime of murder, deliberate] 
tence a court must have before it ,any mitted in this case. Rather, it is 
evidence the defendant w1sbes · to that just as the chroriological aj 
present on why the death penalty sboulcl minor is itseH a relevant mitigati 
not be imposed. tor of great weight, so must •tht 
In arguing against the death peoalty, ground and mental and emotional 
opment of a youthful defendant I 
considered in sentencing.'' · 
The case oow goes back to tht 
boma courts for a new sentencil 
ceedlng. . 
In addition to JuStice O'Connt 
sodate Justices William J. Brenii 
'IbUrgood Marshall and John Pa 
veos joined Justice Powell's m: 
oplnlon. 
Chief Justice Burger, disputii 
majority-'s conclusion that youth' 
tional disturbances merited spec! 
sideration, said, "One might e~ 
surprised if a person capable of a 
and Wlprovoked killing of a polic 
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,; The Sup rem~ c&ur{ co~nu~ itS ~~rnest, thus. "offi~e~ app~ached . on foot; stuck· ~ loaded shotgun 
far unavailing search .for humane ways to mete put out the window and shot the officer dead. · 
capital punishment. Last week's decision in the case Mr. Eddings did not contest his guilt, but. 
of Eddings ~~ Oklahoma dramatized the imeven . pleaded for mercy because of his youth and turbulent ' 
progress, and perhaps the futility, of that quest. · ', .· · history of broken homes and domestic violence. The 
·. Justice Sandra O'Connor1provided the most en- . sentencing judge said he was not persuaded by the 
couraging news. Her crucial fifth vote to overturn the argument of youth and a$]ded, "Nor can the court in 
death senferice of a murderer who was l6 at the time· following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact of 
·of his crim~ placed her firmly with the Court's mod- this young man's violent background." 
.e:t:ate, controlling center .. .... : • - • : 1. · \ But the high court had said that in capital cases, · 
.. ~ Unwilling to rule out capital punishment in all · juStice demands that every mitigating factor be at , 
circumstances, Justice O'Connor ·nevertheless· least considered. Justice Lewis Powell, , writing for · 
agreedwithherpredecessor, POtter Stewart, that the , the majority, called for another sentencing hearing ' 
death penalty is "qualitatively different" from , at which the judge must consider that history, even if 
prison sentences. Her concUrring opinion endo~ he finally deems it outweighed by other factors and 
"eXtraordinary measures" to guard against execu- comes up with the same penalty. · . I 
. tions"outofwhim,passion,prejudice,ormistake." · · In dissent, Chief Justice Warren Burger found 
·, .. But~ the '(ote was close: four dissenters would the record "at best ambiguous" as to whether the 
still resolve ambiguities in favor of execution. That's sentencing judge had ignored or merely discounted 
a precarious margin when the difference is so great. the youth's history. The majority thought the matter 
:;gt7~'·:.~:·' ~:.:~. · .. _' -~- -- .. ~-· ~ . g~~~ ~:~~;thS:td"~U:t~:Yo~~~~~;;::~?~th ~ 
'r , No Justice condoned · 'Monty Lee Eddings's much at stake. ' 
cri!Jle. RUnning away from his Missouri home with a On such fine points and close reasoning pivot 
gi:oup of younger companions, he took his brother's large issues of justice and humanity. The Sqpreme 
car and his father's shotgun and rifles and drove to Court undergoes this painful process because most of 
Oklahoma, where he momentarily lost control of the its members appreciate that death is different. The 
car on a turnpike. When his passengers. warned that very care these cases now require suggests that the 
a highway patrol car was nearby, he boasted that if Court may have to judge every one . . Would it not be 
the officer tried io "stop him he would "blow him better to strike down all death penalties than strug-
away." He obeyed an order to pull over and, as the_ gle for such fine distinctions? ' . ~ . .. ... . . 
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